China’s Economic Growth 1978-2025: What We Know Today about China’s Economic Growth Tomorrow by Carsten A Holz
China’s Economic Growth 1978-2025:  




  Views of the future China vary widely. While some believe that the collapse of China is inevitable, 
others see the emergence of a new superpower that increasingly poses a threat to the U.S. This paper 
examines the economic growth prospects of China over the next two decades.  
  Extrapolating past real GDP growth rates into the future, the size of the Chinese economy surpasses 
that of the U.S. in purchasing power terms between 2012 and 2015; by 2025, China is likely to be the 
world's largest economic power by almost any measure. The extrapolations are supported by two types of 
considerations. First, China’s growth patterns of the past 25 years since the beginning of economic 
reforms match well those identified by standard economic development and trade theories (structural 
change, catching up, and factor price equalization). Second, decomposing China’s GDP growth into 
growth of labor and other variables, the near-certain information available today about the quantity and 
quality of Chinese laborers through 2015, if not several years after, allows inferences about future GDP 
growth.  
  Short of some cataclysmic event, demographics alone suggests China’s continued economic rise. If 
talent is randomly distributed in the world population and if agglomeration of talent is important, then the 
odds are strongly in China’s favor. 
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(minor stylistic revision of 3 July 2005 version) 1. Introduction 
 
  The rapid economic growth of China since the beginning of the economic reforms in 1978 
has captured the imagination of Western commentators and researchers. The responses range 
from outright pessimism about China’s future to fear of a strong China. Lester Brown (1995) 
wonders who will feed China. Gordon Chang (2000) announces the coming collapse of China. 
Callum Henderson (1999) sees China as on the “brink,” while Ross Terrill (2003) writes of the 
“illusory nature of the market in most of the Chinese economy” and that “a crash looms because 
the Leninist core of the regime is unchanged from Mao’s construction of it in Yan’an six decades 
ago” (pp. 329, 313). Nicholas Lardy (1998) stresses the large economic problems and the 
unprecedented potential for social unrest due to ever more indebted state-owned enterprises, the 
extent of nonperforming loans, and a decline in government revenue.  
 
  At the other end of the range are those who project a strong China. Geoffrey Murray (1998) 
describes China as the next superpower. A number of authors view an all-powerful China as a 
threat (Bill Gertz, 2000, or Edward Timperlake and William Triplett II, 2002).
1 News items 
imploring the “devastation Chinese competitors are inflicting on U.S. industries, from 
kitchenware and car tires to electronic circuit boards” and the “futility of trying to match the 
China price” have become common fare.
2
 
  What is undeniable is China’s rapid economic growth over the past 25 years since the 
beginning of economic reforms in 1978, of, measured in gross domestic product (GDP), on 
average 9.37% per year. In economic size China is surpassed today only by the U.S., Japan, 
Germany, and France.
3 Its share in global growth 1995-2002 has been estimated at 25%, 
compared to 20% for the U.S.
4  
 
  While China’s economic growth has received much attention in the popular literature, China 
researchers, when it comes to economic growth, tend to focus on narrow topics, measuring total 
factor productivity growth in enterprises in different ownership forms or investigating the growth 
prospects of individual industries or firms. For example, Douglas Allen (2002) documents the 
transformation in four industries in China and predicts the imminent emergence of world-class 
Chinese brands. Ming Zeng and Peter Williamson (2003) examine the international growth 
prospects of Chinese firms (positive). Colin Carter and Scott Rozelle (2001) ask if China will 
become a major force in world food markets (yes, if structural transformation occurs).  
 
  A number of studies try to explain China’s past economic growth. Much of the transition 
literature explains past reform successes—usually, if only implicitly, measured as economic 
growth—through institutional changes (for example, Qian Yingyi, 2000, 2003, or Wing Thye 
Woo, 1994, 1999). Justin Lin, Cai Fang, and Li Zhou (2003) explain China’s reform success 
with adoption of a “comparative-advantage following strategy,” allowing full play to China’s 
plentiful endowment with labor. Others analyze China’s past economic growth within the 
aggregate production function framework (Wang Yan and Yao Yudong, 2003; Wu Yanrui, 2004, 
Alwyn Young, 2000). The aggregate production function framework is also occasionally 
extended into the future. Gregory Chow and Kui-Wai Li (2002) estimate an economy-wide, 
aggregate production function for the years 1952-98 and obtain GDP values for the years through 
2010 by extending variations of past factor input growth rates into the future; Gregory Chow 
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 (2002) further includes an estimate of year 2020 GDP. A 1997 World Bank policy analysis of 
current economic issues is supplemented by an estimate of China’s GDP in 2020 based on a 
closed-economy model. A systematic study of future economic growth in China that makes full 
use of the hard facts already available today, however, is still lacking. 
 
  Answers to the question of what we know today about the economic size of China ten or 
twenty years from now are relevant not only for the popular discourse on the new superpower 
and for China threat theorists and military strategists, but also for economists. For example, 
conventional economic wisdom holds that free trade benefits, by the laws of comparative 
advantage, all countries in the long run. Thus, a growing China, and growing trade between 
China and the U.S., benefits the U.S. But as Paul Samuelson (2004) within the framework of 
standard trade theory shows, a productivity gain in one country alone may, in fact, lead to a 
permanent loss in per capita real income in the other country; references to China abound.  
 
  This paper examines China’s future economic growth in three steps. First, it conducts a 
straightforward extrapolation of a stable, past growth trend into the future. A number of 
scenarios are played through in a comparison with the U.S. But extrapolation is not a particularly 
convincing research tool. Why should the past continue into the future? 
 
  One argument why past economic growth may continue into the future is that China’s 
economic growth matches standard growth patterns identified by theories of economic 
development and trade. These are structural change, catching up, and factor price equalization. 
China’s past economic growth fits well with all three. Furthermore, China’s reform period 
growth, within these three analytical frameworks, matches those of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan at 
an earlier stage of their development. Obviously, these four countries differ, as do the domestic 
and international circumstances under which they experienced a particular stage of development. 
But the differences need not be systematic with respect to the impact on the dependent variable 
economic growth. These growth patterns may well apply to China in the future, just as they 
already have to Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in the past. 
 
  The final step is to decompose GDP growth. Growth accounting in the production function 
framework turns out to not be useful due to the lack of a stable aggregate production function 
over time. An alternative is to decompose GDP growth following the income approach to the 
calculation of GDP into growth of labor and of other variables. We already know today with 
near-certainty the size of China’s working age population through 2015, and can project with 
high reliability for several years after. In as far as gains in high school and university enrollment, 
most of them very recent, are unlikely to be reversed, a bottom line scenario on the quality of 
China’s future labor force can also be developed. Future GDP growth can be re-composed using 
solely the hard facts about the future quantity and quality of labor available today.  
 
  Demographics in form of the quantity and quality of labor is enough to drive continued 
economic growth in China. Demographics means, for example, that for every “genius” in the 
U.S., China potentially has four. If talent is randomly distributed in the world population and if 
China’s education system is able to identify the brightest students, then China has a larger pool 
of talent to draw from than any other country in the world. If growth and innovation depend on 
the agglomeration of talent (geographically, nationally, culturally, or linguistically), then China 
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 is in an excellent position to continue to grow and innovate. The recent explosion in tertiary level 
education may yet supply the productivity gains that Paul Samuelson identifies as potential 
causal factors for a permanent loss through trade in U.S. per capita real income. 
 
  Projections cannot predict the future with certainty. Potential complications range from a 
collapse of Chinese Communist Party rule to war in the Taiwan Straits; China researchers 
ruminate about such issues as the bad loan problem in China’s banking system, loss-making 
state-owned enterprises, pilfered pension funds, local government budget deficits, rural-urban 
inequality, and environmental degradation. This paper works within these limitations. It does not 
attempt to provide an exhaustive list of complications, to examine the individual issues, to 
quantify their potential impact, and to attribute a likelihood to their occurrence. It predicts 
China’s future economic growth under the assumption that current and future problems continue 




2.  Extrapolation of Past Growth into the Future 
 
  China’s year 2002 nominal GDP of 10.48 trillion RMB at the official exchange rate of 
approximately 8.277 RMB per USD translates into USD 1.27 trillion, compared to year 2002 
U.S. GDP of 10.49 trillion.
6 The U.S. economy in 2002, thus, was eight times larger than 
China’s economy; by 2004, following preliminary figures, the difference was seven-fold.
7 
However, such a comparison neglects to take into account the differing price levels in the two 
countries. The Penn World Tables (PWT), which report comparable GDP data in “international 
dollars,” assume that the general price level in China in 2000 was equivalent to only 23.13782% 
of the U.S. price level. The U.S. economy then, today, in purchasing power terms, is less than 
twice as large as China’s economy. 
 
  Table 1 in the first row extrapolates PWT (version 6.1) data into the future. The PWT do not 
report economy-wide GDP. These values can, however, be obtained, by multiplying per capita 
GDP in international dollars (and constant 1996 prices, using the chain method) by the 
population numbers. Extrapolation into the future is based on year 2000 economy-wide GDP (in 
international dollars, at constant 1996 prices) because 2000 is the most recent year for which 
PWT data are available. The annual real GDP growth rate used to extrapolate into the future is 
the geometric mean of the period 1978-2000; 1978 is chosen as starting year since it marks the 
beginning of economic reforms in China. If China and the U.S. after 2000 each continue to grow 
with the same average annual growth rate they enjoyed between 1978 and 2000, then, as Table 1 
reports, economy-wide GDP (in international dollars, at constant 1996 prices) of China surpasses 
that of the U.S. starting in 2015, a decade from now. 
 
  But the manipulations of official Chinese data in the PWT may not be correct.
8 The second 
scenario in Table 1 therefore uses the PWT year 2000 per capita GDP values (in international 
dollars, at constant 1996 prices) times population—accepting for the time being the PWT 
adjustments to Chinese data in levels—but then applies the average annual real GDP growth rate 
of the years 1978-2000 as implicit in the official data published by the Chinese National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis to the PWT GDP values.
9 Using 
the official national data to obtain the average annual real GDP growth rate yields a larger 
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 growth rate discrepancy in favor of China. Consequently, China’s aggregate purchasing power 
parity GDP begins to exceed that of the U.S. less than a decade from now, namely in 2012. 
 
  The third scenario in Table 1 abandons both the PWT real growth rates and PWT GDP 
values. Instead, it uses national data (for details see notes to table). These are adjusted upward in 
the case of China by the PWT’s purchasing power parity factor of 4.321928 (1 divided by 
China’s price level of 23.13782% of the U.S. price level). The effect is almost the same as in the 
previous case. China’s aggregate purchasing power parity GDP now begins to exceed that of the 
U.S. in 2013 instead of 2012.
10 The fourth scenario, using national base year data of the year 
2002, the latest year for which final (revised) GDP values are available, and national average 
annual real growth rates of 1978-2002, yields a cross-over year of 2013. Assuming lower 
average annual real growth rates for China of 8% or even 7%, while maintaining that of the U.S. 
at 3%, the cross-over year moves further into the future to 2016 and 2020 (fifth and sixth row). 
 
  The price adjustment factor in the case of China carries “substantial uncertainty” (Alan 
Heston, 2001, p. 1).
11 The multiplicative factor of 4.321928 could be significantly off (in either 
direction). The seventh row in Table 1 reports the results if a smaller factor of 3 is used; in 
comparison to the PWT, this means underestimating China’s purchasing power parity GDP. In 
this case, the cross-over year is 2019. If the adjustment factor were to fall gradually over time—
in the PWT it stayed virtually constant throughout the 1990s—assume from a value of 4 in 2002 
to a value of 1 (no adjustment) in 30 years’ time, the cross-over year moves far into the future, 
namely to 2038 (eighth row). Since 2038 is more than 30 years into the future, this is the same as 
making no purchasing power adjustments at all (ninth row). Dropping the purchasing power 
concept and the PWT data altogether, but assuming a 3% appreciation in the official exchange 
rate every year after 2002 results in a cross-over year of 2026 (tenth row). In this scenario, the 
year 2002 exchange rate of 8.2770 yuan RMB/USD falls by approximately half to 4.0717 in 
2026. Including, with the appreciation, some kind of price adjustment, which, even if only at a 
level of 2, currently makes eminent sense, would bring the cross-over year forward to 2019. 
 
  The results reported so far covered aggregate nationwide GDP, with China overtaking the 
U.S. as early as 2012 in the scenario most (and not unrealistically) favorable to China and as late 
as 2038 in a highly unrealistic scenario.  
 
  In terms of per capita GDP, the year when China surpasses the U.S. is far into the future (see 
additional columns in Table 1). But what is far into the future for the average Chinese person 
moves closer to the present for the richer areas of China. Little more than two decades from now, 
coastal China (as defined in the notes to Table 1), accounting for 41.54% of China’s population 
in 2000 and exceeding the U.S. population by 92.04%, may well be as rich, per capita, as the 
average U.S. citizen. Focusing on the five fastest-growing provinces in coastal China only, plus 
Shanghai, with a joint population in 2000 that is 27.14% larger than the U.S. population, moves 
the cross-over year in per capita GDP a few years further to the present. In other words, by the 
mid-2020s, a share of China’s population that exceeds the size of the U.S. population could 
enjoy the same standard of living as the U.S.; in addition, China has a per capita poorer 
hinterland with roughly three times the population in the richer areas.
12  
 
  4 
   In these calculations, all variables were held constant except those explicitly allowed to vary. 
In particular, in the extrapolation of aggregate GDP, the use of an average annual past real 
growth rate reflects the product of the real GDP growth rate per capita and the population growth 
rate. In the short run, such as one decade, changes in the population growth rate are likely to be 
minor, but this may not hold in the long run. Similarly, the exchange rate was held constant 
except in the last two scenarios, as was the price adjustment factor except in the eighth through 
eleventh scenarios. The further into the future, the less valid are the assumptions. A more 
sophisticated approach would, furthermore, focus on the employed instead of the population.
13 
But none of these adjustments is likely to have a significant impact on the determination of 
cross-over years which are as little as one decade away. 
 
  Extrapolations do not constitute a reliable research tool. Factors that promoted economic 
growth in the past may be absent in the future, or factors constraining economic growth may 




3.  Development Theories and Asian Precedents 
 
  Explanations of China’s economic growth tend to focus on economic transition. The 
“success” of the reform process is explained by transition facts and strategies, where success is 
usually taken to imply economic growth (or a rise in living standards). For example, Wing-Thye 
Woo (1994) lists as crucial the creation of non-state firms in every sector of the economy, a high 
savings rate, good initial conditions (such as a small extent of central planning, unemployment in 
the countryside that could be taken up by township and village enterprises, or a limited social 
security net), historical conditions, and the Chinese Diaspora. Qian Yingyi (2000, 2003) ascribes 
much of China’s reform success to the unorthodox economic policy measures adopted by 
China’s leadership; the key to China’s economic growth was the unleashing of incentives and 
competition while making reform interest-compatible for those in power.  
 
  Yet these explanations of past economic reform successes (and thus economic growth) face 
the problem of lack of a counterfactual. Wing-Thye Woo offers cross-country comparisons, but 
the number of explanatory variables appears larger than the number of comparison countries. 
Qian Yingyi makes an in part historical argument, but offers no explicit time series evaluation 
that examines the status before and after a particular reform measure was implemented. These 
explanations, thus, are not as strong as one might wish them to be.
14  
 
  If one claims that economic transition “in total” has caused China’s past economic growth, 
then one could argue that key elements of transition have been in place since the early 1990s 
(price and domestic trade liberalization, the entry of private enterprises) and that therefore the 
gains from transition have already been exhausted. Consequently, economic growth should since 
have slowed, which it didn’t, or it could slow any time now. Alternatively, one could argue that 
past transition measures impact on economic growth over an extended period of time, or that 
transition is as yet incomplete, with further measures to go, in which cases the gains continue. 
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   Growth patterns identified by economic theories of development and trade perhaps offer 
firmer ground. Economic transition could then be viewed as the removal of constraints that 
prevented well-known development patterns from unfolding.
15 Furthermore, if China’s reform 
period growth patterns match those exhibited by other countries at stages in their economic 
development similar to China’s development level in the reform period, then China’s future 
growth patterns may also match those of the other economies later. The argument has two 
foundations: one is a focus on standard growth patterns, the other is a cross-country comparison 
with countries with which a comparison is likely to be meaningful.  
 
  The growth patterns are structural change, catching up, and factor price equalization.
16 These 
three patterns are not independent of each other, nor do they hold irrespective of the larger 
economic environment. They represent uni-causal explanations of economic growth that have the 
advantage that they do not rely on individual transition measures and have been identified by 
development economics and trade theory as of relevance. At the same time, in as far as they 
reveal China to be at the very early stages of accepted development patterns, they support the 
growth projections into the future. 
 
  The comparison countries are Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. These three countries are relevant 
for China only if the assumption of constant effect among the four countries is met: different 
countries do not differ systematically with respect to the impact of the explanatory variable 
(specific to each growth pattern) on the dependent variable (economic growth). While these four 
countries differ, as do the domestic and international circumstances under which they 
experienced a particular stage of development, this does not necessarily invalidate the 
assumption of constant effect. 
 
  The choice of countries to compare China to is a subjective choice, motivated only by the 
desire to make comparisons across a relatively homogeneous group of countries. China may 
share some economic growth patterns with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan due to cultural similarities, 
geographic location, similar economic development strategies, or, in the case of Japan, relatively 
large size of the domestic economy. Limiting the analysis to Japan, Korea, and Taiwan allows 
the careful compilation of the necessary data from each individual country’s statistical office, 
with a very few holes filled using the World Bank Development Indicators database, the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), and the PWT.
17 (The individual data sources are 
documented in Appendix 1.) An attempt was made to cover the years 1960 through 2002, with, 
in some instances, data available only beginning around 1970. Ideally, data for the 1950s should 
also have been included but are not available. The earlier in the development process of Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan, the closer to the case of China the initial conditions might have been. Data 
on China are for the years of the reform period (the years since 1978). 
 
  Throughout, the variable to be explained is real GDP growth per laborer since GDP is 
produced only by the active working population, namely laborers (one PWT figure, Figure 6, by 
necessity uses per capita figures). Employment data are midyear data when related to a variable 
that measures an annual flow, and end-year data otherwise (and then noted with the figure). Each 
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 a. Structural  change 
 
  As labor shifts from low-productivity agriculture to higher-productivity industry and services, 
economy-wide real GDP per laborer, i.e., (partial) labor productivity, increases, if only because 
those laborers who have shifted sectors now produce a multiple of their former output value. 
Figure 1 shows just how big, and increasing, the labor productivity differences are between the 
three economic sectors in China. One would expect to see relatively high aggregate (economy-
wide) labor productivity growth in those years when a relatively large number of laborers shifts 
out of agriculture.  
 
  Figure 2 confirms the expectations. In years with a high absolute reduction in the share of 
laborers in agriculture, the growth rate of (real, likewise below) labor productivity is high. This 
pattern holds equally for all four countries. Among Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the shift out of 
agriculture was, on average, fastest in Korea, followed by Taiwan and then Japan (Figure 3); this 
matches the initial shares of laborers in agriculture, with the highest one in Korea and the lowest 
one in Japan. One would consequently expect China, with an extremely high share of laborers in 
agriculture in 1978, to exhibit rapid reductions in this share, comparable perhaps to Korea, but 
the decline is more gradual. However, if in the official employment statistics the primary sector 
were obtained as residual, it could include an over time increasingly undercounted migrant 
population. The share of the primary sector in employment of, in 2002, approximately 50%, 
would then be an overestimate. 
 
  At China’s 1978-2002 rate of decline, with an annual reduction in the share of laborers in 
agriculture by approximately an absolute value of 0.01 every year (thus, for example, from 0.7 to 
0.69 in one year), China has another forty years to go before its agricultural labor share reaches 
the level of just below 10% at which Japan, Korea, and Taiwan appear to bottom out. Even if 
China’s primary sector employment of 2002 were somewhat overestimated, China still faces 
another two to three decades of labor transfers from the primary sector to the secondary and 
tertiary sector. But this implies that structural change as a source of economic growth has up to 
twenty to forty more years to contribute to labor productivity growth in China. Furthermore, in 
China, a given shift out of agriculture comes with higher labor productivity growth than in any of 
the other three countries. In Figure 2, the observations for China tend to lie above those of the 
other three countries. 
 
 
b. Catching  up 
 
  Catching up means that production techniques and technologies that have already been 
invented and implemented can be copied rather than need to be re-invented; technology transfer 
can also happen through the import of foreign equipment, possibly as part of foreign direct 
investment. Taking the U.S. as the leader in research and development, and proxying the level of 
technological development by labor productivity, the distance between a particular’s country 
labor productivity (in USD) and U.S. labor productivity serves as a measure of the potential 
scope for catching up. One would expect to see relatively high real GDP growth per laborer in 
those cases where the distance to the leading country (the U.S.) is relatively high, i.e., where the 
potential for catching up is large.
19  
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  Figure 4 confirms the hypothesis for Japan. Japan experienced its highest growth rates when 
its labor productivity was only ten to fifty percent of U.S. labor productivity. As the gap closed, 
growth rates in Japan fell (the trend curve shows a slight upswing at the highest labor 
productivity levels that appears to be an artifact of the imposed second-degree polynomial). 
Korea and Taiwan exhibit constantly high growth rates of labor productivity at around 4% to 6% 
throughout all years (Figure 4). But these two countries’ level of economic development is in the 
range of 5% to 50% of the U.S. level, which is a range in which Japan also exhibited high and 
constant labor productivity growth rates. Korea and Taiwan may yet have to experience the 
slow-down that comes when the potential gains from catching up are exhausted. China also 
exhibits a downward pattern, but at a much lower level of economic development. Figure 5 
shows that China’s labor productivity between 1978 and 2002 was only 1.2 to 2.4 % of that of 
the U.S. (using the official exchange rate to translate Chinese yuan RMB values into USD 
values). This seems almost too narrow a band to determine long-term trends. As/if more 
observations become available at higher labor productivity levels relative to the U.S., the 
negative slope could well disappear or turn into a positive one. Whichever direction future 
observations are heading, at China’s highest level of catching up in the past, the growth rate of 
labor productivity was still at a relatively high 6-7%. 
 
  Figure 6 replicates Figure 4 using PWT data. PWT data adjust for differing price levels 
across countries and may also, as in the case of China, undertake further adjustments to official 
data. Data are available for the 1950s through 1990s and are per capita (rather than per laborer); 
the observations for China are as always limited to the years since 1978. The pattern now is one 
of first rising labor productivity at low development levels before gradually falling off. This 
might reflect initial opening up effects as barriers to foreign direct investment and imports are 
removed and access to foreign knowledge increases. The Chinese observations are again 
concentrated in a very narrow band, with a negative slope. 
 
  Independent of the choice of data, China is at a very low development level compared to the 
U.S. It appears to be at a stage of economic development (labor productivity) where other Asian 
countries started out more than 30 years ago. While labor productivity growth appears to fall as 
China catches up with the technology leader (and still is at a very high level), the scale of 
catching up is so small that such factors as exchange rate effects or uncertainties about the scale 
of the purchasing power adjustment could well render the slope coefficient insignificant. In the 
long run, as (if) China catches up with the U.S. and observations at higher development levels 
become available, the negative slope might yet turn into the positive slope that the other three 




c.  Factor price equalization 
 
  The factor price equalization theorem (or Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem) states that 
factor prices, such as skill-specific wages, should equalize between two countries as long as a 
range of assumptions are met. I.e., the skill-specific wage rate of one country divided by that of 
the other country should equal unity.
21 The slightly less restrictive, relative version of the factor 
price equalization theorem focuses on the relative prices of factors of production. Thus, for 
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 example, a country with labor that is cheap relative to capital should see demand for its labor rise. 
As underemployed laborers become fully employed, labor productivity rises. An increase in the 
demand for labor may also be accompanied by wage rises, which in turn are likely to be 
accompanied by labor productivity growth.
22 In the absence of reliable prices of capital, the price 
of capital is approximated here by the price of investment goods. The price of investment goods 
of any particular country relative to the U.S. is available in the PWT. 
  
  Figure 7 reveals an inverse U-shaped pattern for all four countries. In other words, labor 
productivity growth first rises along with relative wage increases and then gradually falls as the 
relative return to factors of production in each country, vs. the U.S., approaches unity. In the case 
of China, also reproduced at a larger scale in Figure 8, the inverse U-shaped pattern occurs at an 
extremely low level, with wage rates in China, relative to investment prices, at only 2-5% of the 
corresponding U.S. ratio. This is well below the early levels of the other three Asian countries. 
Labor productivity growth in China is still high in the declining part of the inverse U-shaped 
pattern at 6-7%. Again, as more observations become available over time, the inverse U-shaped 
pattern may yet change. If this were just the beginning of a long-run trajectory, then the patterns 
of the other three Asian countries suggests that China’s potential for economic growth from 
relatively low labor costs will continue to exist for another thirty years.
23   
 
  This section focused on three explanations of economic growth from development economics 
and trade theory and applied them to the case of China. China’s past economic growth matches 
these standard development patterns, as does economic growth in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. In 
as far as China is located at the early stages of each pattern, in comparison to Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan, there remains much scope for future gains in labor productivity and therefore growth. 
 
 
4. Growth  Accounting 
 
  Growth accounting decomposes GDP growth into growth of variables other than GDP. I.e., 
growth of GDP is “explained” by the weighted growth rates of other variables. One need not 
view these other variables as constituting a satisfactory final explanation of GDP growth; for the 
purpose of forecasting future economic growth, regularity in the relationship with output 
suffices.
24 If GDP growth and the growth of the variables into which it is decomposed exhibited 
a stable relationship in the past, and if this stable relationship is likely to continue into the future, 
then information about the future values of the variables into which GDP has been decomposed 
allows derivation of future GDP growth. One growth decomposition is the traditional 
decomposition of GDP growth into growth of different factor inputs. A second growth 
decomposition follows the income approach to the calculation of GDP. 
 
 
a.  Decomposition of GDP growth into growth of factor inputs 
 
  The traditional approach to growth accounting decomposes economic growth into growth of 
the factor inputs labor, capital, and “everything else” (also “technological progress,” or growth in 
total factor productivity, TFP). The traditional growth accounting equation is 
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 (1)  ,                      t K t L t K b L b c Y ˆ ˆ ˆ + + =
 
where the hats denote growth rates, Y the value of constant-price output, L the (physical) 
quantity of laborers, and K the value of constant-price capital, or 
 
 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( t K t L O t K b L b t c A Y + + + = .              
 
  Estimating the growth accounting equation for China for the period 1978 through 2002 
(growth rates starting 1979), using annual data, yields 
 
      , or  t t t K L Y ˆ 2383 . 0 ˆ 2840 . 0 3609 . 6 ˆ + + =
  (t-values)  (1.1083)  (0.4570)     (0.4735)  
 
 ) ln( 3975 . 0 ) ln( 3859 . 0 0452 . 0 1769 . 4 ) ln( t t t K L t Y + + + = , 
  (t-values)   (1.4822)  (1.0857)   (1.4655)     (1.0551) 
 
with the time variable t equal to one in 1978.
25 Output is official year 2000 GDP with values for 
other years obtained by applying the latest published official real growth rates; the data on the 
midyear quantity of labor (including military personnel) and on the value of capital (in year 2000 
prices) are explained in Carsten Holz (2005b, a). In both equations, all coefficients are 
insignificant.
26 The residuals in both equations are normally distributed and homoskedastic, but 
according to the Durbin-Watson statistic or the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test 
positively serially correlated.
27 Correcting for serial correlation also does not lead to significant 
coefficients. (For the data used here and below see Appendix 2.) 
 
  China’s National Bureau of Statistics publishes nominal GDP values and real growth rates of 
GDP (but no explicit GDP deflator). Each year’s nominal GDP value is revised later, 
approximately one year after first published, but the real growth rates are usually, and 
implausibly, not revised. Using as measure of output in the growth accounting equation the 
official nominal GDP values deflated by the implicit deflator as first published (which is 
presumably final) yields no major changes in estimation results.
28 Using as measure of output in 
the first equation a Tornqvist real growth rate of value-added aggregated across sectors, with 
official sectoral real growth rates weighted by sectoral nominal value-added shares (means of 




  The growth accounting equation can also be augmented by human capital. One approach is to 
include a direct measure of educational attainment in the growth accounting equation. For 
example, Wang Yan and Yao Yudong (2003) construct a human capital variable for the 
population in form of average years of schooling and enter it with the same weight in the growth 
accounting equation as labor. A second approach is to classify laborers by certain criteria, such 
as age and education, and to weight changes in the number of laborers in each category by their 
relative wages. Alwyn Young (2003), for example, adopts this second approach, and estimates 
relative wages from a mix of NBS household survey data of the years 1986-92 and Academy of 
Social Sciences household survey data of 1988 and 1995. This assumes that laborers were paid 
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 their marginal product, at a time (prior to 1992/93) when most goods prices had not yet been 
liberalized and labor markets were virtually non-existent.
30  
 
  Following the first approach and adding a human capital variable in the form of average 
years of education of laborers to the growth accounting equation yields 
 
  ,   t t t t H K L Y ˆ 5829 . 0 ˆ 4463 . 0 ˆ 2740 . 0 0390 . 5 ˆ − + + =
  (t-values)  (0.8344)  (0.4366)     (0.7772)    (-0.7771) 
 
where H denotes the average years of schooling across all laborers. Improvements in the average 
level of education appears to have a negative impact on GDP growth, but none of the coefficients 
is significant (and similarly if the growth accounting equation in logarithms is used), and the 
residuals are serially correlated (correcting for which does not lead to major differences in 
results). 
  
  The fact that all coefficients of the growth accounting equation (without or with human 
capital) are insignificant suggests that one or more assumption underlying the growth accounting 
equation is violated. The growth accounting equation can be derived following two different 
concepts (two different sets of assumptions). One is the concept of a production function, using, 
for example, the Cobb-Douglas production function,  . The underlying assumptions 
are (i) the existence of an economy-wide aggregate production function (i.e., applicability of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function to economy-wide aggregates) and (ii) the particular 





t t K L A Y =
31 The second is the national income accounting concept. By the definition of 
GDP from the income side (more on which below), GDP can be written as Yt = wt Lt + rt Kt , 
where w denotes wages, and r the rental rate of capital (that parameter which makes the product 
with capital equal to GDP less labor remuneration). Assuming (i) constant factor shares and (ii) 
constant growth rates of wages and of the rental rate of capital, a few lines of manipulation yield 
the growth accounting equation.
32  
 
  From the production function point of view, the immediate implication of insignificant 
coefficients is that output elasticities in China during the reform period were not constant over 
time. Further, estimation of an aggregate production function (growth accounting equation) 
works well in practice, even though the assumptions needed for aggregation are virtually never 
met, when aggregate data move little; aggregate data in China, over the reform period, however, 
changed manifold.
33 From the point of view of the national income accounting identity, the 
growth rates of wages and of the rental rate of capital, with standard deviations of 0.0821 and 
0.0443, are not sufficiently stable to yield the growth accounting equation as a tautology from 
the definition of GDP.
34 Consequently, the coefficients in form of factor shares will not be 
accurately estimated. 
 
  A simplification often imposed in the production function approach is to assume, for the 
Cobb-Douglas production function, constant returns to scale (bL=1-bK) and profit maximization 
in a competitive economy, so that output elasticities equal (constant) factor shares. The literature 
that incorporates human capital measures in growth accounting exercises for China indeed does 
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 not estimate the growth accounting equation but simply inserts fixed values of factor shares as 
weights (Wang Yan and Yao Yudong, 2003; Alwyn Young, 2003). The regression results 
obtained above suggest that this is not permissible. A stable aggregate production function does 
not exist for China in the reform period.  
 
 
b.  Decomposition of GDP growth by income categories 
 
  In the income approach to the calculation of GDP, GDP is defined as 
 
 GDP  ≡ labor remuneration + depreciation + net taxes on production + operating surplus. 
 
These data are available for China, for all years of the reform period, at the provincial but not the 
national level. Summing across provinces, and applying the sum provincial shares of the 




  Net taxes on production reflect taxes on production, such as the value-added tax, less 
production subsidies, such as subsidies for policy losses, price subsidies for the grain system, and 
tax refunds for exporting enterprises. The largest part of this income component is likely to 
depend on value-added. Net taxes on production are in the following taken to be a function of 
GDP. 
 
  Depreciation depends on the value of not yet fully depreciated fixed assets. It is in the 
following taken to be a function of capital.  
 
  The operating surplus is a residual. It approximately reflects economy-wide business profit.
36 
Operating surplus is the return to the owners of the capital involved in a productive activity, and 
thus constitutes the economy-wide return on equity. Consolidating balance sheets across the 
economy and eliminating the financial sector so that household savings at banks combined with 
bank loans to enterprises translate into household claims on enterprises, operating surplus 
constitutes the return on fixed assets, intangible assets, and inventories. Since inventories are not 
productive, operating surplus is largely a function of fixed and intangible assets. With data on 
land values not available (and presumably even today much smaller than the value of fixed 
assets), only fixed assets remain as feasible argument. 
 
  The national income equation can then be rewritten as 
 












Y Y ) ( ) 1 ( + + ≡ − ≡ δ τ
τ , 
 
where all variables are defined as above, and δt, τt, and st are the depreciation rate, the net tax rate 
on production, and the surplus rate. Taking derivatives with respect to time and dividing by GDP 
less net taxes on production, while expanding right-hand side terms, yields 
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Using hats to denote growth rates and abbreviating the shares of labor, depreciation, and 
operating surplus in ‘GDP less net taxes on production’ by at
τ, dt
τ , and et
τ  leads to the income 
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  Like the traditional growth accounting equation, the income version represents one form of 
GDP decomposition. Compared to the traditional growth accounting equation, the income 
version newly introduces the growth rates of the real wage rate, the depreciation rate, the surplus 
rate (or “rental rate of capital”), and the net tax rate on production; in exchange, there is no room 
for a residual. There is also no need for assumptions since it is a definitional identity. What is 
called “technological progress” (the residual) in the traditional growth accounting equation, is 
now measured as (and is identical to the) weighted rate of change in real wages, the depreciation 
rate, the surplus rate, and a particular form of change in the net tax rate on production.
37
 
  In the period 1978-2002, nominal GDP deflated by the implicit deflator as first published 
grew by 827%, and nominal GDP less net taxes on production, deflated by the implicit deflator 
as first published, grew by 814%.
38 The difference of only thirteen percentage points implies that 
the changes in the net rate of taxes on production are negligibly small. The income 
decomposition, using the average income shares of 1978-2002—following the standard 
Tornqvist method of weighting factor growth with the mean of the previous and current period’s 


















τ τ τ τ τ τ τ δ + + + + + ≡  
814% ≅ 0.5981*495%   + 0.5981*60% + 0.1370*16% + 0.2649*(-50%) + 0.4019*1185% 
      =  296%     +  36%      +  2%       -  13%                  +  476%  =  797% 
 
In the period 1978-2002, growth in constant-price capital accounted for approximately 60% of 
real GDP growth (476/797) and growth in real wages for 37%; growth in the quantity of labor 
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 contributed just below 5%, with the remainder due to very small positive and negative 
contributions of changes in the depreciation rate and in the surplus rate.
39  
 
  The income growth accounting version only holds with perfect accuracy in the instantaneous 
case when growth rates are infinitesimally small and the factor shares at a given point of time 
therefore are exactly applicable. Measuring growth rates over 24 years introduces a discrepancy 
of 814% vs. 797% due to the need to apply average factor shares. The discrepancy is small, i.e., 
using mid-period weights has little impact on the outcome. The share of labor remuneration was 
rather constant in the period 1978-2002, with a mean of 0.5981 and a standard deviation of 
0.0110 (Figure 9). The share of depreciation rose from 0.1113 in 1978 to 0.1823 in 2002 (with a 
mean value of 0.1370 and a standard deviation of 0.0241), and the share of the operating surplus 
fell from 0.3191 to 0.2253 in the same period (with a mean value of 0.2649 and a standard 
deviation of 0.0286). However, the two shares appear individually only in the products with the 
growth rate of the depreciation rate and of the surplus rate, and these products are relatively 
small. The weight of real capital is again constant (as the sum of the depreciation and surplus 
shares, or unity less the labor share). 
 
  Since the product of the depreciation share and depreciation rate growth in the income 
decomposition of GDP contributed only 0.25% of total growth in 1978-2002, and the product of 
surplus share and surplus growth only (negative) 1.63%, these two terms are in the following 
forecasts ignored. This implies that what is needed to re-compose future GDP growth via the 
income growth accounting equation are only the growth rates of labor, real wages, and real 
capital. The future growth rates of the quantity of labor is readily available if one is willing to 
make a few, plausible assumptions. Those age 15 in 2015 (the minimum working age) were 
already born at the time of the year 2000 population census, i.e., forecasts through 2015 are 
highly reliable, and in as far as trends in reproduction rates have been stable in recent years, 
forecasts through later years are likely to only gradually lose reliability.
40  
 
  What remains is to calculate future growth rates of real wages and of real capital. Ideally, 
their growth rates are related as much as possible to variables whose future values are already 
known today, namely the quantity of labor, the quality of labor, and age measures. These are 
natural explanatory variables for real wages when the unit of analysis is the individual.
41 Since 
they are the only hard facts we have about the future, they are also used to explain real capital. 
This is plausible at least for the quality of capital, because more sophisticated capital is likely to 
require a higher level of education to complement the capital. To some extent it may even be 
plausible for the quantity of capital, if agriculture requires little education and little capital, and 
those who move into other sectors with a higher capital-output ratio are the most educated.  
 
  Examining three dozen potentially wage-related variables in the period 1978-2002, from 
average years of schooling and share of laborers with a particular level of schooling (primary, 
lower middle, upper middle, college, university, post-graduate) to age characteristics and 
potentially relevant non-labor variables, such as the share of foreign direct investment in total 
domestic investment, most of these series are unit root processes.  
 
  The solution then is to find a long-run relationship using the data of the period 1978-2002. 
First, for real wages, the potentially relevant variables were inspected visually for trends, then 
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 subjected to the appropriate augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root and Phillips-Perron tests for unit 
roots in levels, and in first and second differences. The real wage rate, as many other variables, is 
an I(1) process. All tests were conducted for variables in levels as well as in natural logarithms. 
Second, in order to determine the lag length for cointegration testing, unrestricted VARs were 
estimated using the real wage rate and one to three other variables (in approximately three dozen 
different combinations), starting with four lags and reducing the lags one at a time.
42 Third, the 
different combinations of the real wage rate with other variables were tested for cointegration at 
the lag lengths previously determined; since in all cases at least one series exhibited a clear trend, 
cointegration testing was conducted with a constant in the cointegating equation as well as in the 
VAR, and, alternatively with, in addition, a trend in the cointegrating equation. If a significant 
eigenvector (relying on both the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test) was found, a vector 
error correction (VEC) model was estimated. Models with one or more insignificant coefficient 
in the cointegrating equation were dropped. Table 2 reports two long-run relationships embedded 
in the vector error correction models, one with variables in levels, the other with variables in 
logarithms. The same procedure was used for real capital and those results are also reported in 
Table 2.
43 (The underlying, forecast labor and education data are provided in Appendix 4.) 
 
  The first long-run relationship (cointegrating equation) reported in the table is between the 
wage per laborer, the share of laborers with upper middle school education, and the share of 
laborers with college level education or above. For simplicity of exposition, the relationship is 
expressed with the wage per laborer as left-hand side variable. The larger the share of laborers 
with upper middle school education, the lower the wage; the larger the share of laborers with 
college level education or above, the higher the wage. Moving further down the first column, 
none of the variables Granger-causes one of the others.
44 Forecast error variance decomposition 
shows that much of the movement in the wage series is due to its own shocks, but over a ten-year 
forecast horizon, 22% of the forecast error variance of the wage series is due to shocks to the 
share of laborers with college level education or above.
45  
 
  The other three cointegration equations reported in the table all have plausible (and 
significant) coefficient signs; the two cases where variables are in natural logarithms reveal 
strong Granger causality from the education variables to the wage and capital series; over a 10-
year forecast horizon the forecast error variance of capital is mostly accounted for by shocks to 
one of the education variables. The logic behind the use of the variable “average years of 
schooling minus five” in three cointegration equations (squared in one case) is that a primary 
school education is standard, and wage differentiation then depends only on the number of years 
of schooling in excess of primary school education. While primary school lasts for 6 years, the 
1978 average years of schooling is just below 6 years; in order to have a positive variable 
throughout (necessary to take logarithms), 5 years is used as a benchmark.
46  
 
  Table 3 reports the average annual growth rates of the three variables wages, capital, and 
labor, and then the resulting GDP growth rates, all in 5-year periods as well as over the total 
period 2000-2025. The first four data columns report the growth rates obtained by fitting the four 
cointegration questions of the previous table to the forecast education and labor data through 
2025. When the cointegration equations are estimated in logarithms, the resulting growth rates 
tend to be higher, especially far into the future. The forecast quantity of labor series (fifth data 
column) has a falling positive growth rate that eventually (by 2014) turns negative.  
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  Assuming a constant depreciation rate, surplus rate, and net tax rate on production (as the 
decomposition for the period 1978-2002 suggests is permissible), future GDP growth can be 
obtained by summing the growth rates of wages, capital, and labor; in each year, the weights, in 
form of the tax-adjusted labor share and one minus this share, are the previous-year values (for 
details see notes to the table). Depending on if the cointegration equation using variables in 
levels or in logarithms is used, the resulting average annual GDP growth rate of the period 2000-
05 is 5.80 or 8.09% (sixth and seventh data columns in the table). With actual real growth in this 
period likely to be between 8 and 9%, the second series, with the cointegration based on 
variables in logarithms, seems to be more accurate.
47 In the periods 2005-10 and 2010-25, the 
two series yield rather similar estimates, in the range of 7.05-9.42%. At this level of economic 
growth, the extrapolations of Table 1 suggest that China will surpass the U.S. economy in size, 
using the purchasing power concept, around the middle of the next decade. 
 
  Further into the future, the predictions diverge significantly, with one GDP growth series 
falling off, and the other rising. Due to the recent explosion in education, the out-of-sample 
forecasts use education values that are far from sample average values. As the educational level 
of laborers increases, the marginal product of education could fall, and the predicted values then 
constitute an overestimate; on the other hand, if labor is increasingly paid its marginal product 
value rather than state-ordained wages, the predicted values constitute an underestimate. The 
comparison of the two GDP growth series shows well the degree of uncertainty involved in 
predicting further into the future than 2015. The two series reflect extreme scenarios. A different 
combination of wage and capital series yields intermediate growth values. 
 
  An alternative approach to predicting GDP growth is to assume a constant labor share. This 
is plausible given worldwide experiences. Figure 10 shows that it is also plausible given past 
labor share values in China (now labor share in GDP, not in GDP less net taxes on production). 
Given the definition of the labor share as labor remuneration divided by GDP, and, if dividing 
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I.e., real GDP growth is simply the sum of real wage growth and labor growth.
48 Data on future 
labor growth through approximately 2025 are available. Real wage growth is plausibly explained 
by the quantity and quality of labor. The relationship for the period 1978-2002 was identified 
above and can be applied to the reliable data on the future quantity and quality of labor available 
through approximately 2025. This procedure by-passes the need for a capital series. Table 3 in 
the last two columns reports the results. They carry no new or different insights but confirm the 
findings following the more elaborate decomposition of GDP growth by income categories. 
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  The growth forecasts use only facts about the future quantity and quality of laborers in China 
that are near-certain today. With little change in China’s labor force over the next twenty years, 
economic growth depends on growth in the wage rate and, in the decomposition of GDP growth 
by income categories, the accumulation of physical capital. The time series estimations 
established a long-run relationship of both variables to human capital and labor data, with the 
relationships then applied to future human capital and labor data. The next section explores in 
more detail the most recent developments in human capital formation in China. 
 
 
5. Human  Capital 
 
  Growth in human capital in reform period China has been rapid. A comparison with the U.S. 
puts China’s human capital measures into perspective, while the development of education in 
China over time reveals the scale of changes underway.  
 
  Table 4 compares the educational level of the Chinese vs. U.S. population as reported in the 
population censuses of 1990 and 2000 in both countries.
49 As a percentage of the total 
population, a far higher proportion of the U.S. population has achieved a secondary or tertiary 
level of education. For example, in 1990, 75.2% of the U.S. population had completed high 
school, but only 9.52% of the Chinese population had; 20.3% of the U.S. population had 
completed a bachelor’s degree (or above), but only 0.56% of the Chinese population had. But 
because the U.S. population in 1990 was only 28% of the size of the Chinese population (in 2000, 
24%), the difference shrinks by a factor of approximately four once total population numbers are 
considered.  
 
  Between 1990 and 2000, China narrowed the relative gap. While in 1990 the number of U.S. 
citizens with high school education was 1.65 times the number in China, by 2000 this ratio had 
fallen to 1.17 (last column in Table 4). For the BA degree, the ratio fell from 7.59 to 4.33. At the 
level above the bachelor’s degree the ratio in 2000 was still 21.42 in favor of the U.S. (with no 
such figure available for 1990). 
 
  These data cover the population in total. But the educational level of different age cohorts in 
China is changing rapidly over time. Figure 11 shows that in 2000 more than half the population 
age 65 or above had a level of education below primary school; only 10.55% had some form of 
secondary education (lower or upper middle-school), and 1.50% had a tertiary level education. In 
contrast, in the age cohort 20-29 years, only 2.06% had a level of education below primary 
school, 20.98% completed only primary school, 69.44% achieved some form of secondary 
education, and 7.53% obtained a tertiary level education. The age cohorts in between reveal a 
smooth transition from the less educated older generation to the ever better educated younger age 
cohorts.
50 At the primary and secondary school level, the Chinese age cohort 20-29 years in 2000 
comes close to the U.S. population average level, but in tertiary education still falls far short. 
 
  Current-year new enrollment data at the tertiary level reveal that at the BA level (including 
college-level associate degrees) China has caught up with the U.S. Figure 12 shows new 
enrollment numbers in Chinese BA programs, in contrast to the U.S. In the reform period, new 
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 enrollment in China first languished, but began to expand gradually in the early 1980s and then 
rapidly after 1998. In 1998, new enrollment was at approximately twice its 1978 level. But then, 
in the course of just 5 years, between 1998 and 2003, new enrollment almost quadrupled. Since 
2001, the absolute new enrollment number in Chinese BA programs at (only) regular institutions 
of higher education exceeds the number of freshmen in the U.S. China’s preliminary figure on 
new enrollment at regular institutions of higher education for 2004 is 4.473m, and the projection 
for 2005 is 4.75m.
51 If U.S. new enrollment numbers continue to be stable over time (Figure 12), 
new enrollment in China is currently twice the U.S. figure.  
 
  Data on the joint category of MA and PhD new enrollment in China (also Figure 12) follow 
the same trend as new enrollment for the BA/ college-level associate degree. Lacking data on 
new enrollment at the graduate level in the U.S., and therefore assuming that the past graduation 
number of 400-500,000 MA and PhD degree holders is an accurate indicator of current new 
enrollment, U.S. enrollment numbers at the graduate level were five times the Chinese figure in 
1999, but only 1/3 above the Chinese figure in 2004. 
 
  With new enrollment at the tertiary level rising drastically in recent years, so does the 
number of graduates (Figure 13). The absolute number of undergraduate level graduates in China 
came within hair-width of that in the U.S. in 2003.
52 If students newly enrolled in 1999/2000 
graduated in 2003 (3-4 years later), then the number of graduates in 2007 should be about three 
times larger than in 2003. Because U.S. enrollment numbers have risen only marginally in recent 
years, the number of undergraduate degrees awarded in China in 2007 will then be more than 
twice the number in the U.S. 
 
  At the MA and PhD level (with only joint data available for China), the U.S. in 2003 still had 
a 5-fold lead in absolute graduation numbers (Figure 13 and Table 5).
53 But with U.S. graduate 
numbers stable, Chinese enrollment rates of 2003, assuming no drop-outs, imply that the gap will 
narrow to a barely 2-fold lead for the U.S. by 2006, while 2004 enrollment numbers suggest a 
less than 1.5-fold lead for the U.S. in 2007.
54
 
  At the high school level, the number of Chinese graduates has well exceeded their U.S. 
counterpart in absolute numbers throughout the reform period. In 2003, China had 2.48 times 
more high school graduates than the U.S. (Table 5).
55  
 
  The price of education in China has been rising rapidly. Supposedly strict limits on fees 
levied on compulsory education suggest that much of the price increase reflects demand for 
senior high school and tertiary level education. Between 1988 (the earliest year for an 
uninterrupted time series through today) and 2003, the consumer price index (CPI) rose by an 
average of 6.20.% per year. But its subindex “tuition and child care” rose by an average of 
20.05% per year, i.e., almost four times faster than the CPI (Figure 14).
56 The difference in price 
increases was largest in the late 1990s, despite the at this time drastic increase in new enrollment 
at regular institutions of higher education, where at least admission to the BA, if not to the 
college-level associate degree, is government controlled. Only in 2002 and 2003 has the 
difference in price increases narrowed to a few percentage points, which could suggest that 
demand is finally leveling off (unless price caps were imposed by the government).  
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   Head count data do not necessarily translate into comparable accumulation of human capital 
since they reveal nothing about the quality of education.
57 But it is not at all certain that 
education in China through the secondary school level is necessarily inferior to that in the U.S. 
Even at the tertiary level, a provincial railway ministry college in China need not be inferior to a 
U.S. community college. At the top range of tertiary education, the conclusion is likely to be far 
less ambiguous; at that level, Chinese students seem to make good use of U.S. institutions. 
 
  The explosion in education is only happening since the late 1990s. Much of the upgrading in 
the education level of Chinese laborers will not be felt until some years later. This again implies 
a fair amount of uncertainty about where exactly China’s economy will be by 2025. Not all the 
additional graduates are likely to be as qualified as the average graduate of earlier generations. 
On the other hand, with current private returns to education possibly far below the marginal 
product value, further reforms could mean a more important role for education in economic 
growth in the future. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions and Implications 
 
Extrapolation into the future of China’s reform period economic growth suggests that the size 
of China’s economy will exceed that of the U.S., in purchasing power parity terms, in less than 
ten years. Per capita, the point of time when China catches up with the U.S. is much further into 
the future, thirty to forty years from now, although the coastal areas, especially the in the past 
fastest growing five provinces together with Shanghai, with a population exceeding that of the 
U.S., may catch up in as little as two decades.  
 
China’s economic development in the reform period fits well with the broad development 
patterns of structural change, catching up, and factor price equalization, not least in comparison 
with other Asian countries earlier in their economic development. On all accounts, China has 
twenty to forty more years of gains in economic growth to reap. Re-composing China’s 
economic growth from growth in income components suggests that China’s continued growth is 
inevitable. Based on the year 2000 population census combined with past and current trends in 
education, the quantity and quality of China’s laborers can be predicted with near-certainty 
through 2015, and with high reliability for the years after. These forecasts suggest economic 
growth between 2005 and 2015 in the range of 7-9%, high enough for China to catch up with the 
U.S., in purchasing power terms, within a decade or less. 
 
  Growth accounting illustrates the correlation between (and potential impact of) changes in 
the educational structure of China’s population and (on) economic growth. China’s population is 
four times the size of the U.S. population. If talent is randomly distributed among the world 
population and if China’s education system is able to identify the brightest students, then China 
has a larger pool of talent to draw from than any other country in the world.
58 If innovation 
depends on the agglomeration of talent (geographically, nationally, culturally, or linguistically), 
then China is in an excellent position to grow and innovate.
59
 
  Demographics also matters in terms of market size (and 80% of China’s population lives in 
the densely populated Eastern part of the country). Size of the domestic market should allow 
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 unprecedented variety and economies of scale. It is likely to have a positive impact on 
competition and, thereby, rationalization and innovation. The large pool of laborers, compared to 
other countries, could in time lead to a highly efficient allocation of labor in that each labor 
market niche can be filled by the appropriate talent. 
 
Domestically, China’s continued economic growth means that one-fifth of the world 
population will continue to experience significant improvements in their living standard. A share 
of China’s population that exceeds the size of the U.S. population will enjoy living standards 
close to the level of developed countries in the near future. Others will rise out of poverty, while 
the sweatshops of early industrialization disappear sooner rather than later. Internationally, 
China’s economic growth will continue to affect relative prices and production structures around 
the world. China’s trade volume is exceptionally large by international standards. In 2000, 
China’s ratio of ‘exports of goods and services’ to GDP was 25.90%, compared to 11.21% for 
the U.S.
60 By 2003, China’s ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP at 34.24% was almost 
ten percentage points higher (while imports stood at 31.69%).
61 Even if this ratio only stays 
constant in the future rather than rises further, China’s economic growth means that China will 
soon be the world’s largest exporter and importer.  
 
While some in the West fret about the “China price” and its impact on Western economies, 
some firms in Western economies will benefit from the increasing division of labor, as will those 
who have a stake in these firms (for example, the typical pension fund of citizens of Western 
countries). Two-thirds of China’s imports originate in Asia (where it sends half of its exports). 
China’s economic growth, therefore, induces economic growth in other Asian countries. India 
may be tempted by China’s example into sustained, growth-promoting economic reforms. It 
appears only a matter of time (ten years?) before the center of world economic activity, as 
measured by GDP, shifts to Asia.  
 
  These developments appear little different from the economic rise of other nations in the past, 
except perhaps the speed at which they occur, and the breadth of implications due to the size of 
China. But what may cause particular discomfort in the West is the fact that China is, following 
its Constitution, a “people’s democratic dictatorship ... under the leadership of the Communist 
Party of China.” As China’s FDI abroad grows, political questions may become more pressing,  
such as to what extent Chinese investors abroad are simply extensions of the Politburo (which 
appoints the managers of 53 of the largest state-owned enterprises), or to what extent the world 
plays by the rules of China’s dictator(s) a few years down the road? 
 
  But the influence goes both ways. In 2003, 16.48% of value-added in industrial enterprises 
with annual sales revenue in excess of 5m yuan RMB (USD 0.6m) within China was produced 
by foreign-funded enterprises, a figure which excludes an additional 11.15% in enterprises 
funded by Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwanese entrepreneurs.
62 For years to come, China is 
likely to want to enjoy the benefits of access to foreign capital and foreign technology. China is 
adopting international standards and practices on a scale and at a speed as perhaps no other 
county in the world ever has. A larger share of China’s bureaucrats and enterprise managers are 
likely to have a foreign education or work experience abroad than in Western countries. On 
many measures, China is an extremely open economy. 
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   China’s rapid economic rise is not guaranteed. Economic problems range from bad loans in 
the banking system to an under-funded pension insurance scheme, the lack of a rural health care 
system, and bankrupt local governments. Yet China’s leadership has a track record spanning 
more than two decades of rising to economic challenges and addressing problems as they 
become urgent. At a 9.37% average annual real growth rate, furthermore, GDP doubles every 
eight years; if the absolute size of a financial deficit stays constant during this period, its 
significance, as a share of GDP, is halved. This provides all the more reason for China’s 
leadership to stay focused on economic growth. 
 
  Economic growth also does not necessarily come with the connotation “good.” Much of GDP 
growth could be accompanied by significant environmental degradation and resource exhaustion. 
A “green GDP” growth rate could be several percentage points lower.
63 At some point, China’s 
leadership may no longer wish to trade off China’s environment and resources for GDP growth. 
But even once that happens, it is likely to be a gradual process. 
 
  Political constraints may yet pose greater constraints on China’s economic growth than 
economic or financial imbalances. Growing inequality or increasing dissatisfaction with 
widespread government/Party corruption could lead to a breakdown of political governance in 
China. From a more continuous perspective, China’s severe control over access to information is 
unlikely to advance economic growth. At least social scientists work within a framework of 
relatively scarce information; information is more freely available only to those who are part of 
internal circles. Consequently, public scientific discourse is limited and a significant Chinese 
language research community centered around Chinese language research publications has yet to 
emerge. When China’s economy is ready to move from catching up to innovation on a larger 
scale, these information constraints are unlikely to be helpful. A second aspect is the Party’s 
control over key appointments across the economy, from state-owned enterprises to the banking 
system (and, naturally, all leadership positions in government). The consequences of the 
appointment of, when in doubt, “red” rather than professional managers, and the absence of 
effective control mechanisms is unlikely to be conducive to economic growth and efficiency; 
evidence in form of corruption scandals abounds. These political constraints not only threaten to 
have a direct impact on the operation of China’s economy, but are also likely to continue to 
induce some of the best Chinese-born talents to move or stay abroad.   
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 Table 1.  First Year in Which China’s GDP Exceeds U.S. GDP 
  Dataset for  Price adjustment? Exchange rate adjustment?  Aggregate Per capita GDP 
  base year  ave. growth rate    GDP  Nationwide Coast 6 prov.
1.  PWT (2000)  PWT (78-00)  (Implicit price adjustment factor for China)  2015  2052     
2.  PWT (2000)  National (78-00)  (Impl. price adj. factor for China, 4.321928 in 2000)  2012  2039     
3.  National (2000)  National (78-00)  Year 2000 PWT price adj. factor for China: 4.321928  2013  2039     
4.  National (2002)  National (78-02)  Year 2000 PWT price adj. factor for China: 4.321928  2013  2039  2026  2023 
5.  National (2002)  Ch.: 8%; U.S.: 3% Year 2000 PWT price adj. factor for China: 4.321928  2016       
6.  National (2002)  Ch.: 7%; U.S.: 3% Year 2000 PWT price adj. factor for China: 4.321928  2020       
7.  National (2002)  National (78-02)  U.S. prices = 3 * China prices  2019  2045  2030  2027 
8.  National (2002)  National (78-02)  Adj. factor 4 in 2002, linear reduction to 1 over 30 years 2038  2064  2045  2041 
9. National  (2002)  National (78-02)    2038  2064  2045  2041 
10.  National (2002)  National (78-02)  Exchange rate appreciates 3% every year   2026  2044  2033  2030 
11.  National (2002)  National (78-02)  Exch. rate appr. of 3%/an.; price adj. factor, China: 2   2019  2036  2026  2024 
  All extrapolations are based on real growth rates.  
  “PWT” refers to the Penn World Tables; absolute PWT data are in (comparable) international dollars, i.e., the Chinese values reflect price adjustments as 
well as corrections to the underlying official Chinese GDP data as deemed necessary by the authors of the PWT. Aggregate GDP values in international dollars 
are obtained by multiplying the per capita values by the population (with both time series provided in the PWT). 
  “Coast” refers to the coastal provinces of China; it includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, 
and Guangxi (the small province Hainan was omitted due to a lack of data through the 1970s and most of the 1980s, when Hainan was a province of Guangdong). 
“6 prov.” refers to the five fastest-growing coastal provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong) plus Shanghai. The share of the coast in China’s 
population in mid-2000 was 41.54%, and in annual GDP 63.96%; the corresponding shares of the six provinces were 27.49% and 46.16%. 
  Per capita GDP values in the first two rows are from the PWT; the PWT do not specify if the underlying population data are midyear or end-year data, and a 
comparison of the PWT population values with the official Chinese and U.S. population values does not yield a sufficiently close match to draw a conclusion. 
Per capita GDP values based on national data, for both China and the U.S., were obtained by dividing aggregate GDP by the midyear population; U.S. population 
data for the years 2000 and 2002 are post-census annual (midyear) population estimates. Chinese provincial-level population data are based on the 1 July 1982 
and the 1 November 2000 censuses, with mid-1978 and mid-2002 values obtained by extrapolation using the implicit average annual population growth rate of 
1982-2000.  
  For economy-wide GDP, the average annual real growth rate in China based on national data during the years 1978-2000 was 9.5162% and during the years 
1978-2002 9.3661%; for the U.S., these values are 3.1056% and 2.9578%. Per capita, the Chinese values are 8.1409% and 8.0435% and the U.S. values 1.9990% 
and 1.8530%; the PWT 1978-2000 real per capita GDP growth rate for China is 6.5628% and for the U.S. 2.1158%. (2000 is the most recent year for which PWT 
data are available.) The average annual population growth in China based on NBS data was 1.2718% (1.2578% in the PWT) between 1978 and 2000, and 
1.2241% between 1978 and 2002; the corresponding U.S. figures are 1.0849% (0.9720% in the PWT) and 1.0847%. 
  If the base year dataset consists of the national (official) data of China and the U.S., then the official exchange rate of the RMB (Renminbi) is used to 
convert Chinese RMB values into USD values. The average exchange rate in 2000 was 8.2784 yuan RMB/USD, and in 2002 8.2770. 
  In the PWT the U.S. price level is set at 100; China’s price level in 2000 was 23.13782, compared to 53.87897 in 1978, 22.82256 in 1995, and (a local high 
point of) 24.53505 in 1997. Since the PWT data end in 2000, the year 2000 price level was used for price adjustments even when the base year is 2002. If 
China’s price level continued to decline in 2001 and 2002 (as it did in 1998, 1999, and 2000), China’s GDP in international dollars would have been even larger. 
25 
Sources: Penn World Tables (PWT 6.1), at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/Downloads/index.htm (accessed June 2003). Census 2000 Major Figures, pp. 16, 31. 
Statistical Yearbook 1991, p. 79; 2003, pp. 55, 58, 97, 654. Bureau of Economic Analysis, at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn1.htm (accessed December 
2003). Population data are from http://eire.census.gov/popest/archives/pre1980/popclockest.txt and http://eire.census.gov/popest/data/national/tables/NA-














































































Employment data are midyear values. All employment data (sectoral, total) between 1989 and 1990 
experience a statistical break; 1990 total employment exceeds that of 1989 by 17.03%. Official 
(unadjusted) employment data are used. The secondary sector comprises industry and construction. 
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Japan 1971-2002, Korea 1971-2002, Taiwan 1967-2002, and China 1979-2002 (except 1990). 
Employment data are end-year values. 
Two data points are omitted in order to keep the chart compact: Korea 1972 (0.0224, 0.9448) and 1998 
(0.0125, -4.6146). 
Figure 2.  Structural Change and Labor Productivity Growth  
 






































































Employment data are end-year values. 
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Japan 1961-2002, Korea 1971-2002, Taiwan 1967-2002, and China 1979-2002 (except 1990). 
Figure 4.  Catching Up and Labor Productivity Growth  
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All data are PWT data (labor productivity growth, and labor productivity growth as percentage of U.S. 
level). 
The data (following PWT data availability) cover the following periods: Japan 1951-2000, Korea 1954-
2000, Taiwan 1952-1998, and China 1979-2000. 
One data point is omitted in order to keep the chart compact: Korea 1998 (42.26, -7.36). 
Figure 6.  Catching Up and Labor Productivity Growth (PPP-adjusted per capita data), 
1950s-1990s 
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Japan 1961-2000, Korea 1971-2000, Taiwan 1967-1998, and China 1979-2000 (except 1990). The 
relative investment prices (only) are from the PWT. 
Wages and investment prices are relative to the U.S. 
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Wages and investment prices are relative to the U.S. 
Figure 8.  Relative Factor Price Equalization and Labor Productivity Growth in China, 
1979-2000 (except 1990) 
 



















The values of all income components are by necessity derived from provincial-level data published in 
GDP 1952-95, GDP 1996-2002, and for the years since the mid-1990s in the corresponding year’s 
Statistical Yearbook. For each year, the share of each income component in ‘GDP less net taxes on 
production’ is obtained as the sum across provinces of the values of a particular income component 
divided by the sum across provinces of ‘GDP less net taxes on production.’  
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For notes see previous figure. 
Figure 10. Income Factor Shares in GDP 
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Table 2.  Cointegration Equations, 1978-2002/03 
“Dependent” variable  All variables in levels  All variables in natural logarithms 
  A. Wage  B. Capital  A. Wage  B. Capital 
Regression number  I  II  III  IV 
Constant 4387.96 4144.38 6.2426  7.6163






D. Average years of schooling 








F. Share of laborers with upper 




G. Share of laborers with college 











Lag length of the VEC  2 2 1  2
Trace, maximum eigenvalue test  1%, 5% 1%, 1% 1%, 1%  5%, 5%
Normality (10% level)  OK OK C 1%, E 10%  OK




period 3  
A: 97/ 1/ 2
F: 34/ 66/ 0
G: 72/ 78/ 21
B: 87/ 11/ 2
D: 19/ 77/ 5
H: 83/ 1/ 17
A: 82/ 3/ 15 
C: 0/ 94/ 6 





A: 66/ 12/ 22
F: 16/ 81/ 3
G: 19/ 60/ 21
B: 25/ 70/ 5
D: 23/ 72/ 5
H: 33/ 45/ 22
A: 65/ 4/ 31 
C: 11/ 89/ 10 
E: 13/ 60/ 27 
B: 29/ 71
C: 6/ 94
Number of observations  23 22 24  22
Wage per laborer: labor compensation in the national income accounts divided by the number of laborers 
including military personnel (in yuan per laborer); deflated by the GDP deflator (in 2000 prices).  
Capital: measure of capital’s contribution to production, in billion yuan, deflated by the GDP deflator (in 
2000 prices). 
Number of laborers is in billion. 
Values in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates are t-values.  
Trend: the cointegrating vector (as does the VAR) always includes a constant; depending on the results of 
the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test, a trend is included or not. 
Trace, maximum eigenvalue test: significance level of the existence of one eigenvector. 
Normality in VEC equations: Jarque-Bera values are used (based on Cholesky (Lutkepohl) 
orthogonalization). When normality is rejected for one of the VEC equations at the 10% level, the 
significance level is stated together with a letter which identified the variable that, in first differences, 
is the dependent variable of the particular equation.  
Granger causality “Y: X (Z%)” means that “Y is Granger-caused by X (at the 0.1, 1, 5, or 10% 
significance level).” 
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 Variance decomposition: a Cholesky ordering of variables as listed above in the particular table column 
was used, and the forecast error variance decomposed annually over a period of 10 years. Values are 
percentages, ordered as the variables appear in the column. For example, if the three variables 
involved are A, C, and D, and the variance concerned is that of A, then A/C/D % of the variance of  A 
is explained by variation in A, C, and D. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 
Results of unit root tests: probability, in %, of rejecting the hypothesis of “has unit root” in levels, i.e., is 
I(1)  –  in  first differences, i.e., is I(2)  –  or in second differences, i.e., is I(3). Variable A (real wage 
per laborer) in levels: augmented Dickey-Fuller test with up to 8 lags (determined by the Schwartz 
Information Criterion) 65 I(1) – 4 I(2) – 4 I(3), and Phillips-Perron test 92 – 44 – 4, i.e., the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test indicates a unit root in levels, while the Phillips-Perron test indicates a 
unit root in levels and perhaps also in first differences. When the augmented Dickey-Fuller test uses 
many lags (around 7 or 8), the test was also conducted using 1 lag. Logarithm of real wage per laborer: 
26 – 8 – 1, 62 – 49 – 1; real capital (B): 100 – 3 – 17 (at lag length 8, 1 at lag length 1), 100 – 42 – 0; 
logarithm of real capital : 51 – 3 – 33 (at lag length 8, 0 at lag-length 1), 33 – 42 – 0; logarithm of 
average years of schooling minus 5 (C): 62 – 0 – 13, 30 – 0 – 4; average years of schooling minus 5, 
squared: 94 – 13 – 1, 84 – 27 – 1 (D); logarithm of share of laborers with primary school education 
(E): 73 – 4 – 0, 80 – 4 – 0; share of laborers with upper middle school education (F): 99 – 0 – 1, 4 – 0 
– 1; share of laborers with college level education or above (G): 99 – 3 – 1, 100 – 24 – 1; number of 
laborers (H): 97 – 55 – 0, 92 – 4 – 0. 
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Table 3.  Growth Forecasts (average annual growth rates in %) 









Labor  Equation (2)  Labor share 
assumed fixed 
     I+II  III+IV  I  III 
2000-05 4.15  6.98  5.18 10.91 0.83 5.80  8.09  4.98 6.05
2005-10 8.18  6.37  6.29 10.85 0.71 7.84  8.83  8.89 7.05
2010-15 7.76  5.63  7.81 10.75 0.20 7.06  9.42  7.96 8.03
2015-20 6.36  5.40  11.79 10.71 -0.80 5.50  10.85  5.56 10.90
2020-25 4.63  4.14  14.22 10.54 -0.62 4.06  12.02  4.01 13.51
2000-25 6.20  5.70  9.01 10.75 0.06 6.05  9.83  6.26 9.07
Cumulative:                  
2000-25 350.04  299.69  763.49 1184.75 1.58 333.77  942.78  356.58 777.14
  The numbers I – IV refer to the previous table. All calculations are done annually before averaging to 
five-year or 25-year values. The antilogarithm was applied to the annual forecast values of the wage rate 
(III) and capital (IV) before calculating growth rates.  
  GDP calculated via the definition of the labor share, with an assumed fixed labor share (of 0.5138, 
year 2000) in GDP including net taxes on production, uses one of the two wage series plus the labor 
series.  
GDP calculated using equation (2), in addition, uses one of the two capital series; the depreciation 
rate, surplus rate, and net tax rate on production are assumed constant and therefore do not enter into the 
calculation. Equation (2) reduces to  
).
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τ τ τ τ τ τ − + + = + + + ≡  
When calculating the year 2001 GDP growth rate, the actual year 2000 labor share in GDP less net taxes 
on production (0.5985) is used to weight the 2001 (over 2000) growth rates of the real wage rate, labor, 
and real capital. When calculating the year 2002 GDP growth rate, the year 2001 labor share is used; the 
2001 labor share is calculated using the actual year 2000 real wage rate augmented by its fitted 2001 
growth rate, the forecast labor value of 2001, and the actual year 2000 GDP value augmented by its 2001 
growth rate derived in the previous step. The same step-by-step procedure is used for the following years. 
Using variables I+II, the minimum labor share in the period 2000-2025 is 0.5741, the maximum labor 
share 0.6336; using variables III+IV, the two values are 0.4615 and 0.5961. 
  For comparison, the average annual GDP growth rate in 1978-2003 was 9.37% (using the official real 
GDP growth rates) or 9.72% using the latest revised nominal GDP data combined with the first published, 
implicit GDP deflator; the cumulative growth rate is 839.29% and 915.96%. 
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Table 4.  Educational Level (or Higher) of Population Age 25 or Older (Census Data) 
  in %  Absolute number (mio.)  Ratio US/ 
This degree or above  US China  US  China  China 
  2000 
High school  80.4 16.5 146.498 125.137  1.17
Some college  51.8 94.386  
College-level associate degree  4.3 32.457  2.91
Bachelor’s degree  24.4 1.4 44.460 10.258  4.33
Advanced degree  8.9 0.1 16.217 0.757  21.42
Reference: total population age 
25 or higher  182.212 760.480  0.24
  1990 
High school  75.2 9.52 119.469 72.421  1.65
Some college  45.2 71.809  
College-level associate degree  1.51 11.517  6.24
Bachelor’s degree  20.3 0.56 32.250 4.249  7.59
Advanced degree  7.2 n.a. 11.439 n.a.  n.a.
Reference: total population age 
25 or higher  158.868 571.589  0.28
}
}
For the classification see Appendix 5. Advanced degree holders in the U.S. refers to the three degrees 
above B.A., in China to Master’s or Doctorate degree holders. No data on advanced degree holders in 
China for 1990 are available. If Bachelor’s degree and above in the case of the U.S. were compared to 
College-level associate degree and above in China, the ratio of the U.S. to China in 1990 is 2.80 
(32.250/11.517), and in 2000 it is 1.37 (44.460/32.457). 
U.S. data report degree obtained, while Chinese data include those who have already obtained the 
particular degree as well as those who are currently studying for the particular degree. Since the U.S. age 
classification is limited to those age 25 and older (and the Chinese classification has been reduced here to 
the U.S. classification), the number of Chinese who are currently studying towards a particular degree 
should be small, except possibly in the case of advanced degrees.  
Sources: 
U.S.: Educational Attainment 2000.  
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“No school/ lit. class” refers to no schooling or only basic literacy class (below primary school level). 
Source: Census 2000 (nationality), pp. 125-7. 
Figure 11. Share of Educational Level in Individual Age Groups, China, 2000 (in %) 



































China: BA + Assoc. (left scale)
U.S.: Undergr. freshmen (left scale)
China: MA + PhD (right scale)
 
  “BA” in the case of China refers to (current-year) new enrollment in regular institutions of higher 
education, i.e., includes BA and college-level associate degree programs of regular institutions of higher 
education; no data on new enrollment in college-level associate degree programs of “non-regular” 
institutions of higher education are available. For the U.S., only data on “first-time freshmen” are 
available; the coverage is unclear, but seems to be 2-year and 4-year programs, presumably associate and 
BA programs, and possibly including professional degree programs. Stable graduation figures in U.S. 
MA/PhD programs suggest new enrollment in these programs of at least 400,000 to 500,000 per year 
(assuming no drop-outs).  
  In China, in 2003, 56.76% of total enrollment in regular institutions of higher education was in 
regular BA programs (benke), while the rest was in college-level associate degree programs (zhuanke); 
but only 47.76% of new enrollment in regular institutions of higher education was in regular BA 
programs. In the U.S. in 2001, the latest year for which the data are available, 54.42 of total enrollment in 
undergraduate programs (in a table distinguishing between undergraduate, first-professional, and 
graduate programs) was in 4-year programs, the rest in 2-year programs (with such a breakdown for new 
enrollment not available). 
  Data for the U.S. for the years through 1995 cover “institutions of higher education,” and since 1996 
“degree-granting institutions” (which include some additional institutions, primarily 2-year colleges, and 
exclude a few higher education institutions that did not award associate or higher degrees); for first-time 
freshmen enrollment, both sets of data are available for 1996 and 1997: data in the latter classification are 
3-4 percentage points larger than the data in the earlier classification.  
Sources: 
China: Statistical Yearbook 1990, pp. 708f.; 2003, pp. 720f.; 2004, pp. 780-2. 
U.S.: http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d03/tables/dt183.asp, and …/dt179.asp, accessed on 13 Dec. 
2004. 
Figure 12. Tertiary Level New Enrollment, China and U.S. 
 






















China: BA + Assoc.
U.S.: BA + Assoc. + Prof.
China: MA + PhD
U.S.: MA + PhD
 
  “BA” in the case of China refers to graduates of regular institutions of higher education, i.e., includes 
BA and college-level associate degrees granted by regular institutions of higher education; no data on 
college-level associate degrees granted by “non-regular” institutions of higher education are available. 
“BA” in the case of the U.S. refers to associate degrees, BA degrees, and first professional degrees. If first 
professional degrees had been included with MA/PhD, in 2003 the U.S. “BA” category would have been 
smaller by 3.98%, and the U.S. MA/PhD category would have been larger by 15.63%. 
  U.S. data for 2002 and 2003 are official projections. Data for the U.S. for the years through 1995 
cover “institutions of higher education,” and since 1996 “degree-granting institutions.” (Also see notes to 
Figure 12.)  
  In China in 2003, 49.51% of the “BA + Assoc.” graduates received a BA degree, the others a college-
level associate degree. In the U.S. in 2001, BA degrees outnumbered associate degrees 2:1 (1,244,171 vs. 
578,865). 
Sources: 
China: Statistical Yearbook 1990, pp. 708f.; 2003, pp. 720f.; 2004, pp. 780-2. 
U.S.: http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/tables/dt246.asp, accessed on 1 Jan. 2004 (no update 
available as of 14 Dec. 04); http://nces.ed.gov/quicktables/Detail.asp?Key=1017. 
Figure 13. Tertiary Level Graduates, China and U.S. 
 

































CPI (pre-89: urban only)
Tuition & child care (pre-89: urban only)
 
  CPI: Consumer Price Index. 
  A break-down of the category “tuition & child care” into the two subcategories is available for the 
years 1988 through 1993. The cost of “tuition & child care” in the years 1987-93 rose by an average of 
18.68% per year, the cost of tuition by an average of 20.82% per year, and the cost of child care by an 
average of 12.54% per year. Assuming constant weights for the two subcategories in these years, these 
average annual growth rates imply that the price of tuition carries a weight of 0.7418 and the price of 
child care a weight of 0.2582 in the construction of the index for “tuition & child care.” 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook 1990 through 2004, price section in each issue. 
Figure 14. Inflationary Pressures in Education Sector 
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 Table 5.  Annual Secondary and Tertiary Level Graduates in China Vs. the U.S. 
  China  Ratio: China relative to U.S. 
  (absolute numbers)  China 
  Regular   Post-      high school  regular institutions of  research students 
  institutions  graduates      Def. 1  Def. 2  higher education   
  of higher  (MA, PhD)  U.S. 
 education 
(1,000) 
 High  school    Associate, 
BA 





1978 165  9 2.18 2.26 0.12 0.18 0.00  0.00 
1979 85 140  2.34 2.40 0.06 0.09 0.00  0.00 
1980 147  476 2.02 2.19 0.11 0.16 0.00  0.00 
1981 140  11669 1.61 1.84 0.10 0.15 0.03  0.04 
1982 457 4058 1.04 1.23 0.33 0.48 0.01  0.01 
1983 335 4497 0.81 1.02 0.24 0.35 0.01  0.01 
1984 287 2756 0.69 0.92 0.20 0.29 0.01  0.01 
1985 316  17004 0.73 1.05 0.22 0.32 0.04  0.05 
1986 393  16950 0.85 1.25 0.27 0.40 0.04  0.05 
1987 532  27603 0.92 1.41 0.37 0.54 0.07  0.09 
1988 553  40838 0.90 1.41 0.39 0.56 0.10  0.12 
1989 576  37232 0.89 1.42 0.40 0.57 0.09  0.11 
1990 614  35440 0.90 1.50 0.41 0.58 0.08  0.10 
1991 614  32537 0.89 1.57 0.39 0.56 0.07  0.09 
1992 604  25692 0.91 1.60 0.37 0.53 0.05  0.07 
1993 571  28214 0.93 1.64 0.34 0.49 0.06  0.07 
1994 637  28047 0.85 1.58 0.37 0.54 0.06  0.07 
1995 805  31877 0.80 1.63 0.47 0.69 0.06  0.07 
1996 839  39652 0.81 1.77 0.49 0.72 0.08  0.09 
1997 829  46539 0.85 1.87 0.48 0.71 0.09  0.10 
1998 830  47077 0.93 2.01 0.48 0.70 0.08  0.10 
1999 848  54670 0.95 2.07 0.48 0.71 0.10  0.11 
2000 950  58767 1.07 2.22 0.53 0.77 0.10  0.12 
2001 1036 67809  1.19 2.30 0.57 0.83 0.11  0.13 
2002 1337 80841  1.32 2.31 0.70 1.04 0.14  0.16 
2003 1877  111091  1.53 2.48 0.97 1.44 0.19  0.22 
U.S. degree data of 1978 are for the year 1977/78, and similarly in all other years. Chinese data 
appear to be based on calendar years. U.S. tertiary sector degree data of 2002 and 2003 are official 
projections. 
The first definition of graduates of Chinese secondary schools (“Def. 1”) only comprises graduates of 
regular upper middle schools; the second definition includes graduates of all institutions of secondary 
education (regular, vocational, and technical schools, and teacher’s colleges).  
Graduates of Chinese “regular” institutions of higher education (putong gaodeng xuexiao) cannot be 
immediately matched with U.S. degrees. Regular institutions of higher education issue BA and college-
level associate degrees. 
Sources: 
China: Statistical Yearbook 1990, pp. 709, 711; 2003, pp. 720f. 
U.S.: Department of Education website: http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/tables/dt246.asp accessed 
on 1 Jan. 2004, and http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/tables/XLS/Tab103.xls accessed on 2 
March 04, as well as same address with “d03” instead of “d02,” accessed on 13 Dec. 2004. 
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The wage rate is calculated as payments to labor (in the national income and product accounts) 
divided by economy-wide employment. Official employment data except for Taiwan are end-
year data. When employment data are in the following related to annual flow measures, these 
end-year employment data are first turned into midyear values (the arithmetic mean of previous-
year and current-year values); this is the case for sectoral labor productivity in China, the growth 
rate of real GDP per laborer, GDP per laborer, and wages per laborer. End-year values are used 
for the annual absolute change in the share of agriculture in employment, and for the share of 
agricultural laborers in economy-wide employment (Figure 3). Taiwan data are manipulated 
correspondingly. All data in Figure 6 are PWT data; population data are presumably end-year 
data and not further manipulated; country-specific investment prices (used in Figure 7, Figure 8) 





Nominal and real GDP: World Bank Development Indicators database (at 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/). Labor compensation in the income approach to GDP: 
Annual Report on National Income Statistics, various years, for 1953-89; 
http://portal.stat.go.jp/PubStat/topE.html for 1990-02. 
Employment: Japan Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 496. Employment data for agriculture, with 
corresponding total employment in the same table, are from the Annual Report on National 
Income Statistics, various years, for 1970-96, and from 
http://portal.stat.go.jp/PubStat/topE.html for 1997-2002. The total employment figures in 
these latter sources differ slightly from those in the Japan Statistical Yearbook 2004, and are 
only used for calculating the share of agricultural in employment. 
Exchange rate: PWT (1960-1970), IFS (1971-2002). 
 
Korea 
All data are from the Korea National Statistical Office (at http://www.nso.go.kr). 
 
Taiwan 
Nominal and real GDP: Government statistics portal (at 
http://www.stat.gov.tw/bs4/nis/enisd.htm) with online Statistical Yearbook (Taiwan) 2002. 
For labor compensation, in particular, Statistical Yearbook (Taiwan) 2002, p. 152; 2003, p. 
152; and various earlier hardcopy issues. 
Employment: online Statistical Yearbook (Taiwan) 2002, p. 48; 2003, pp. 43, 48; various earlier 
hardcopy issues; 2003 values (needed to derive end-year 2002 employment) from 
http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas03/bs7/yearbook/ch3/3-4.xls#a2, accessed on 20 
May 05. 
  40 
 Exchange rate: online Statistical Yearbook (Taiwan) 2003, p. 246; IFS for years prior to 1973; 




GDP: nominal GDP: Statistical Yearbook 2003, p. 55; real GDP growth: Statistical Yearbook 
2003, p. 57; labor compensation: GDP 1952-95 (for 1978-92, 1995), various pages (sum 
across provinces); Statistical Yearbook, individual issues with data for 1993, 1994, and 1996-
2002 (also sum across provinces); the share of sum-across-provinces labor compensation in 
sum-across-provinces income approach GDP is multiplied by the official (production 
approach) economy-wide GDP figure to obtain an estimate of economy-wide labor 
compensation. 
Employment: aggregate: Statistical Yearbook 2003, p. 124; agriculture: Statistical Yearbook 
1994, p. 86; 2003, p. 128. Between 1989 and 1990, China’s economy-wide number of 
laborers increased by 17.03%, with a 14.12% rise due to a post 1990-census switch to a new 
time series. Prior to 1990, the published economy-wide number of laborers constituted the 
sum of laborers across industrial sectors (hangye). Since 1990, the economy-wide number of 
laborers exceeds the sum across industrial sectors significantly in each year, but continues to, 
as in all reform years, equal the sum across economic sectors (chanye; primary, secondary, 
tertiary). Since the economy-wide number following the new time series for the years since 
1990 is the one compiled according to international definitions of employment, the economy-
wide number of laborers in the years prior to 1990 was adjusted following the population 
censuses of 1982 and 1990 (later-year official values rely on population census data). For 
details see Carsten Holz (2005b); the 1990 midyear census employment value is slightly 
above the 1990 end-year employment value in the Statistical Yearbook, which means that the 
mid-year 1991 employment value calculated from the Statistical Yearbook data is close to the 
1990 midyear census employment value. No adjustment was attempted, and the 1991 growth 
rate in labor productivity is omitted from the charts . The share of agriculture (taken to be the 
primary sector) in economy-wide employment is in all years based on the official data; the 
statistical break 1989/90 occurs across all economic sectors and the total (employment in the 
three economic sectors always adds up to the total). 
Exchange rate: IFS (for 1978-80); Statistical Yearbook 2001, p. 586 (for 1981-84); 2003, p. 654. 
Sectoral labor productivity growth rates (Figure 1) are based on 1978 aggregate value-added 
(Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 53) and cumulative real growth rates (same source, p. 56) 
combined with average annual employment derived from end-year labor data for the years 
1977 through 2003 (Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 120, for 1978 through 2003, and Fifty 




National income and product accounts data are from the BEA website at 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn1.htm. 
Employment data are from the BLS website at http://www.bls.gov/ (unadjusted employment 
level, series LNU 02000000). 
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 Appendix 2.  Data 1978-2003 
  1  2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14 






































1978  362.4  0.3174  111.7 0.496560 0.097062 0.128124 0.278245 0.459063 5.874791 0.301122 0.170157 0.008486 2749.608 2354.2723 
1979  403.8  0.3293  107.6 0.513799 0.096169 0.122185 0.267847 0.469033 5.783396 0.316217 0.143832 0.008467 3029.126 2534.2218 
1980  451.8  0.3432  107.8 0.511476 0.098178 0.121286 0.269060 0.484319 5.760803 0.326867 0.125707 0.008548 3301.316 2720.0263 
1981  486.2  0.3497  105.2 0.526832 0.099723 0.119050 0.254395 0.499914 5.788318 0.334703 0.114849 0.008717 3574.954 2981.4397 
1982  529.5  0.3502  109.1 0.535664 0.100167 0.116219 0.247949 0.517864 5.837811 0.340401 0.108246 0.009026 3867.181 3308.4062 
1983  593.5  0.3545  110.9 0.535442 0.101235 0.115860 0.247462 0.531081 5.900243 0.346449 0.103756 0.009425 4191.373 3626.5069 
1984  717.1  0.3718  115.2 0.536801 0.100116 0.117936 0.245148 0.551481 5.972499 0.352423 0.101061 0.009891 4548.309 3875.9280 
1985  896.4  0.4041  113.5 0.529008 0.099484 0.120505 0.250982 0.570896 6.058273 0.357315 0.099803 0.010445 5076.077 4210.9495 
1986  1020.2  0.4244  108.8 0.528206 0.104881 0.125085 0.241809 0.587218 6.158283 0.360549 0.100347 0.011187 5733.765 4833.6678 
1987  1196.3  0.4497  111.6 0.520210 0.107488 0.124799 0.247505 0.604605 6.270596 0.362084 0.102767 0.012160 6417.825 5400.9083 
1988  1492.8  0.5033  111.3 0.517224 0.106701 0.130615 0.245455 0.622572 6.468605 0.368652 0.105128 0.014059 7186.390 5928.7643 
1989  1690.9  0.5488  104.1 0.515126 0.113077 0.132888 0.238910 0.634099 6.666102 0.373349 0.108808 0.016417 8020.676 6717.1315 
1990  1854.8  0.5783  103.8 0.534191 0.116730 0.130573 0.218506 0.650444 6.863468 0.375724 0.113875 0.019301 8851.721 7514.3278 
1991  2161.8  0.6021  109.2 0.521607 0.123265 0.132686 0.222446 0.651200 6.953363 0.373345 0.113062 0.020981 9761.820 8570.6868 
1992  2663.8  0.6329  114.2 0.500942 0.128676 0.133742 0.236639 0.658215 7.038792 0.371426 0.112448 0.022791 10814.752 10176.8551 
1993  3463.4  0.7188  113.5 0.506673 0.116288 0.138373 0.238666 0.664800 7.122996 0.369984 0.111960 0.024744 11966.836 12060.7728 
1994  4675.9  0.8384  112.6 0.511986 0.119137 0.136277 0.232600 0.671315 7.205689 0.368746 0.111680 0.026953 13271.268 13435.2360 
1995  5847.8  0.9477  110.5 0.528411 0.123477 0.128526 0.219586 0.677600 7.289890 0.367423 0.111722 0.029475 14748.564 14255.3711 
1996  6788.5  1.0142  109.6 0.533974 0.128038 0.125712 0.212276 0.685075 7.448646 0.357653 0.115332 0.032891 16471.326 15602.7077 
1997  7446.3  1.0267  108.8 0.527937 0.136264 0.131568 0.204232 0.693850 7.596186 0.348787 0.118467 0.036419 18422.663 17713.6154 
1998  7834.5  1.0155  107.8 0.531394 0.144735 0.133998 0.189873 0.702285 7.737696 0.340230 0.121446 0.040095 20512.538 20078.0205 
1999  8206.8  0.9914  107.1 0.523849 0.150666 0.135394 0.190091 0.710155 7.874455 0.331786 0.124648 0.044000 22731.288 22722.7281 
2000  8946.8  1.0000  108.0 0.513819 0.154022 0.141553 0.190605 0.717395 8.005892 0.323572 0.128259 0.048078 25057.903 24928.0360 
2001  9731.5  0.9996  107.5 0.514532 0.157159 0.140750 0.187559 0.725550 8.133471 0.315726 0.132589 0.052258 27427.441 27495.6018 
2002 10517.2  0.9939  108.3 0.509225 0.156699 0.140426 0.193649 0.733825 8.257059 0.308102 0.137888 0.056451 29922.827 30258.4914 
2003 11739.0  1.0119  109.3 0.496246 0.159006 0.142855 0.201894 0.740860 8.380055 0.300270 0.144599 0.060694    
1: Official, nominal revised GDP (Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 53; Statistical Abstract 2005, p. 18); 2: GDP deflator based on nominal GDP and real 
growth as first published (Statistical Yearbook series; “first published” relevant for years since 1988); 3: Official real GDP growth rate (Statistical 
Yearbook 2004, p. 55); 4-7: for sources see note 35; 8-12: (i) laborers and education data include military personnel, (ii) education shares denote the 
share of laborers with this level of education as highest level of education (source: Carsten Holz, 2005b); 13: Capital data, deflated using the investment 
deflator (Carsten Holz, 2005a, data using investment-based scrap rates); 14: Capital data, deflated using the GDP deflator of column 2 (original 
nominal data from appendix “Fixed Asset Data” to Carsten Holz, 2005b). Nominal wages can be obtained as (columns) 4*1/8. 
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 Appendix 3.  Capital in the Income Decomposition of GDP 
 
 
  The income version offers scope for a more discriminating treatment of capital. In a 
production function framework (the traditional growth accounting equation), the value of capital 
should reflect the contribution of capital to production. In the income version, a distinction 
between capital in the depreciation process and capital in the creation of operating surplus is 
possible. (i) In the depreciation process, the most suitable value of capital appears to be the book 
value in the accounting system of the owner of the fixed asset (on the basis of which depreciation 
is calculated); applying an approximate economy-wide depreciation rate to the depreciation 
component of income approach GDP yields the book value of fixed assets. In other words, 
instead of, as above, obtain the depreciation rate by dividing the depreciation component by the 
production value of fixed assets, the book value of fixed assets is derived as residual using the 
economy-wide depreciation rate. (ii) In the creation of operating surplus, the choice of capital 
value depends on how one wishes to interpret the surplus rate, as return on the book value of 
fixed assets, or as return on the productive capacity available (or in use). Suppose the latter. Then 
the income growth accounting identity needs to distinguish between accounting capital K
A (with 
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814% ≅ 0.5981*495%   + 0.5981*60% + 0.1370*(38%+985%) + 0.2649*(-41%+1185%) 
      =  296%     +  36%      +     140                      +  303%    =  775%. 
  
  For the two types of capital values see Carsten Holz (2005a), who derives capital values 
under both concepts. (The accounting concept reflects an unknown mix of original values and 
market value actually used in Chinese enterprise accounts.)  To illustrate the distinction between 
the two capital concepts further, suppose an investment is undertaken that involves a new factory 
which houses 10 machines, and suppose the value of these fixed assets is depreciated linearly 
over 10 years. From an accounting point of view, the value of the fixed assets after the first year 
is 90% of the original investment value, 80% after the second year, etc.; after ten years, the value 
of the fixed asset is zero. From a market value point of view, the fixed assets are valued at their 
current market value each year and depreciation is adjusted correspondingly. Chinese enterprise 
accounts may use either the original accounting value or revised, market-based values. 
(Revisions seem to have happened only in the mid-1990s.) From a production point of view, the 
productive capacity of these fixed assets does not change over several years. In particular, it is 
not the case that after the first year, 1/10
th of the roof of the factory building caves in and one 
machine dissolves into thin air, after the second year another 1/10
th of the roof caves in and 
another machine disappears, etc. The contribution of the fixed asset to the production process is 
unchanged until the factory roof actually caves in and the machines can actually no longer be 
used; that could be twenty years after the initial investment. Perhaps an older factory building or 
older machinery need more repairs or more frequent maintenance, but these (as long as they 
happen during hours when the fixed asset is not in use) do not affect the contribution of the fixed 
asset to the production process; if anything, output rises because the cost of a mechanic 
constitutes value-added. 
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Appendix 4.  Projections of the Quantity and Quality of Labor, 2000-2025 













2000 0.714409 8.012866 0.322023 0.128666 0.047978
2001 0.720456 8.121377 0.316476 0.132001 0.049943
2002 0.726477 8.225262 0.310170 0.135132 0.052176
2003 0.732213 8.328351 0.303293 0.138031 0.054809
2004 0.738277 8.429856 0.295426 0.140944 0.057955
2005 0.744419 8.525540 0.290574 0.144071 0.061807
2006 0.748436 8.630268 0.283859 0.147869 0.066709
2007 0.753146 8.739400 0.276419 0.152366 0.072457
2008 0.759109 8.853824 0.268099 0.157413 0.078968
2009 0.765298 8.971423 0.259523 0.162841 0.086169
2010 0.771226 9.087972 0.250992 0.168101 0.093810
2011 0.775696 9.204913 0.242083 0.172995 0.101810
2012 0.778933 9.319190 0.233075 0.177402 0.109984
2013 0.780788 9.432353 0.223856 0.181429 0.118242
2014 0.780522 9.547423 0.214194 0.185377 0.126681
2015 0.779117 9.663950 0.204020 0.189114 0.135212
2016 0.776259 9.781167 0.193563 0.192779 0.143936
2017 0.771466 9.902992 0.182228 0.196412 0.152955
2018 0.765336  10.026827 0.170430 0.199982 0.162217
2019 0.757166  10.158197 0.157691 0.204050 0.171948
2020 0.748612  10.291379 0.144724 0.208449 0.181854
2021 0.740170  10.422555 0.132106 0.212959 0.191815
2022 0.733109  10.546202 0.120267 0.217183 0.201424
2023 0.728962  10.655325 0.109798 0.220659 0.210190
2024 0.727125  10.749938 0.101092 0.223477 0.218290
2025 0.725704  10.838512 0.093474 0.226045 0.226240
Data are from Carsten Holz (2005b). Values for 2000-03 differ slightly from those in Appendix 2 due to 
(by necessity) different procedures used in the construction of the two sets of data. Each set of data is 
consistent individually. 
 
  44 
 Appendix 5.  Comparison of U.S. Vs. Chinese Education System, Classification as Used in Censuses 
 U.S.  China 
  No schooling completed  No schooling 
  Nursery school to 4
th grade  Literacy class 
 5
th or 6
th grade   
Primary level  [Completion of 6
th grade]  Completed primary school (6







th grade   
    Completed lower middle-school (9
th grade; chuzhong) 
 10
th grade   
 11
th grade   
 12
th grade, no diploma   
Secondary level  High school graduate  Completed upper middle-school (12
th grade; gaozhong) 
  Some college credit, but less than 1 year   
  1 or more years of college, no degree   
  Associate degree (for ex., AA, AS)  --- Special middle-school (zhongzhuan) 
Tertiary level (China)    College-level associate degree (daxue zhuanke) 
Tertiary level  Bachelor’s degree (for ex., BA, AB, BS)  Bachelor’s degree (daxue benke) 
  Master’s degree (for ex., MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA)   
  Professional degree (for ex., MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)   
    Master’s degree (one form of yanjiusheng) 
  Doctorate degree (for ex., PhD, EdD)  Doctorate (the second form of yanjiusheng) 
  Further details on the U.S.: (i) the associate degree is a degree granted for the successful completion of a subbaccalaureate program of studies, 
usually requiring at least 2 years of full-time college-level study; (ii) the bachelor’s degree is a degree granted for the successful completion of a 
baccalaureate program of studies, usually requiring at least 4 years (or the equivalent) of full-time college-level study; (iii) the master’s degree is a 
degree awarded for successful completion of a program generally requiring 1 or 2 years of full-time college-level study beyond the bachelor’s 
degree, (iv) the professional degree is a “first” professional degree which requires at least 2 academic years of work before entrance and a total of 
at least 6 academic years of work to complete the degree program, including both prior required college work and the professional program itself; 
depending on the field it corresponds to a Chinese B.A. or possibly a Chinese M.A. or even Ph.D. 
  Further details on China: (i) upper middle-school comprises three types of schools, the 3-year regular upper middle school (putong gaoji 
zhongxue) which prepares for university entrance, the 3-year vocational upper middle school (zhiye [gaoji] zhongxue), and the 2-3 year technical 
school (zhondeng jishu xuexiao), which in contrast to the first two, is typically run by companies, such as the railway company; a small fourth 
category of teachers’ colleges, zhongdeng shifan xueyuan, may be combined with the technical schools under the heading “special middle school,” 
zhongdeng zhuanye xuexiao); (ii) there is some ambiguity about the special middle school (zhongzhuan): it could be comparable to the upper 
middle-school, as a 3-4 year program following lower middle-school, or it could be a 2-3 year alternative to college/ university level education 
  45following usually upon completion of upper middle-school, and leading to special degrees (such as nursing, in the U.S. an Associate degree) with 
receipt of a diploma (biyezheng, zige) rather than an academic degree (xuewei) upon completion; it seems that whether zhongzhuan denotes a post-
upper middle-school education or an alternative upper middle school education depends on the context of the statistics in which the label appears; 
(iii) the college-level associate degree is typically a three-year program usually duplicating but falling just short of a regular university education 
(with BA positions strictly regulated and limited by the government, universities but also non-governmental organizations offer this college-level 
associate degree to those wishing to obtain further education but unable to enter BA programs; this category appears to cover a wide variety of 
programs, from programs run by universities in parallel to their BA programs, to nursing programs, as in the special middle school, and various 
programs run by non-governmental or semi-governmental organizations); (iv) medical doctors graduate from a 5-year (rather than 4-year) BA 
program; (v) the master’s degree is a research (thesis) degree of three years’ duration (a BA degree is usually a prerequisite); (vi) the doctorate 
degree is a research degree of three years’ duration (a master’s degree is usually a prerequisite). Compulsory education in China runs through 
completed lower middle-school (9
th grade). 
Sources: 
U.S.: Educational Attainment 2000 (possible responses to question of “What is the highest degree or level of school this person has COMPLETED? 
Mark x ONE box. If currently enrolled, mark the previous grade or highest degree received.” in year 2000 census). For the further details in 
the notes to the table see http://nces.ed.gov//programs/projections/appendix_D.asp#1, accessed on 24 Feb. 2004. 
China: Census 2000; Statistical Yearbook 2003, education section; communication with university professor in China. 
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1   Emma Broomfield (2003) provides an overview over the “China threat” literature. Stanley Lubman (2004) 
documents the negative views of China in U.S. congressional debates. 
2   The quotes are from “The China Price” in Business Week, 6 Dec. 2004 (issue 3911), pp. 102ff. 
3   China and France “compete” for fourth place, with the outcome depending on the exact Euro-USD exchange 
rate. (Statistical Abstract 2005, p. 203) 
4   See The Economist, 15 Nov. 2003, p. 67, quoting the Bank Credit Analyst, a Canadian research firm.  
5   This paper is also not concerned about how meaningful the concept of GDP data is for measuring “well-being” 
or “standard of living.” One may further question if value-added created in China contributes as much to well-being 
as does value-added created in the U.S., or vice-versa. Since the use of GDP as a measure of economic size, or, in 
per capita terms, as a proxy for standard of living, dominates in the literature as well as in popular discussions, this 
paper focuses on GDP. 
6   See Statistical Yearbook 2003, p. 55; http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/gdplev.xls (accessed 19 May 2005). 
7   See Statistical Communiqué 2004, p. 1; http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2005/gdp105a.xls 
(accessed 19 May 2005). Chinese GDP is 13.6515 trillion yuan RMB, the exchange rate 8.277 RMB per USD, and 
U.S. GDP 11.735 trillion USD. 
8   Carsten Holz (2005c) argues that the manipulations, which follow a study by Angus Maddison, are not plausible. 
9   A theoretical explanation for using real growth rates derived from nominal GDP and domestic prices rather than 
international prices is based on the Gerschenkron effect, namely that, empirically, the use of early-year prices leads 
to larger estimates of growth rates than the use of late-year prices (explained by the substitution effect from 
expensive to cheaper products); for developing countries, international prices are like “late-year” prices. Lawrence 
Klein and Suleyman Ozmucur (2003, p. 21f.), thus, feel that China’s purchasing power parity GDP growth rate is 
likely to be too low. On the other hand, Alan Heston, Daniel Nuxoll, and Robert Summers (1995) find just the 
reverse to be the case for the aggregate PWT data across the 116 countries in their study; they attribute their findings 
to the high level of aggregation in the PWT. 
10   The PWT revised China’s official GDP value of 2000 (and earlier years) upward; this causes the cross-over 
year in the second scenario to be one year earlier than in the third scenario. 
11   The price adjustment factor reflects three separate factors for investment, household consumption, and 
government consumption. The price adjustment factor in each of these three categories is a geometric mean of two 
values. (i) One value is an extrapolation from the 1985 PWT 5.6 value. This value in turn appears to incorporate a 
number of estimates by individual researchers. Ren Rouen and Chen Kai (1994) in a detailed study offer an 
adjustment factor for 1986 of approximately 3.8963. (I derived this numerical value by multiplying the average 
annual official exchange rate of 3.4543—the arithmetic mean of the four arithmetic means of beginning-quarter and 
end-quarter exchange rates in 1994—by Ren Rouen and Chen Kai’s convertor for RMB into USD of 1/0.8709. For 
the exchange rates see Financial Yearbook 1986, p. II-39; 1987, p. II-24.) (ii) The other value is a 1993 Guangdong 
vs. Hong Kong binary comparison value (downward adjusted in an attempt to reflect a multilateral basis). 
12   The average annual per capita real growth rate of China’s richer coastal provinces used in the calculations here 
automatically incorporates the influx of people into the richer coastal provinces throughout the last two decades; i.e., 
by construction of the average, the newcomers to the rich areas have achieved the same average per capita GDP as 
the old inhabitants of the rich areas. There is no reason why this should not continue into the future (and the 
extrapolations here implicitly assume it does), leading to a larger share of China’s population (and thus a larger 
absolute number of Chinese people) enjoying the higher living standard in the future. If the official population data 
were to cover only the population registered with a regular residence right (hukou), the per capita GDP used in the 
coastal and six-province calculations here should be smaller; this is the case because, in current form, these per 
capita GDP data then do not incorporate laborers without regular residence in these provinces (which all experience 
labor inflows), but include the value-added they produce. This latter scenario is unlikely since the population data 
used are census data (see notes to  ). The 2000 census of 1 November 2000 requires local presence for the 
past half year to be counted in a particular locality; the 1982 census of 1 July 1982 has a 1-year requirement but 
migrant labor was probably a phenomenon of negligible size in 1982. 
Table 1
13   Reliable calculations based on employment are not possible. The PWT report per capita GDP in international 
dollars, as well as population data, but not employment data. The PWT also report per worker GDP in international 
dollars, with the underlying (but not reported) employment data purportedly from the International Labour 
Organization. For the case of China, combining the PWT data on “real GDP per capita (chain),” population, and 
“real GDP chain per worker” yields employment values that neither match the official data nor the author’s adjusted 
employment data (to bridge a statistical break in 1990). Compared to the author’s (through 1990) adjusted midyear 
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employment values, the PWT employment numbers are 13.00% larger in 1978 and 6.49% larger in 2000. The PWT 
population data, on the other hand, roughly match the official data published in the Statistical Yearbook. 
14   In a different approach, Wing-Thye Woo (1999) examines the results of sector-level reforms in China, thus 
breaking the case of China down into several sectoral observations (which, however, are not independent). Thomas 
Rawski (1999) traces the interaction between different reforms; in total, these are taken to add up to the reform 
success. The World Bank (1997) examines a variety of “strengths and advantages” that it posits promote economic 
growth and a variety of “risks and challenges” that it thinks hamper economic growth” (p. 19). 
15   Many constraints have disappeared after twenty-five years of reform. In terms of sales value, prices of 
approximately 90% of all goods have been liberalized. (See the Price Yearbook each year for the shares of prices 
that are market prices, mandatory prices, or guidance prices, for each of three categories: agricultural procurement, 
retail sales, and producer goods. It is questionable if “market prices” in China are truly market prices, and are so at 
all times.) State trading monopolies have largely disappeared. Export and import interventions (from administrative 
controls to quotas and tariffs/ subsidies) are all reaching the long-run levels committed to by China when joining the 
WTO. China has current account convertibility and partial capital account convertibility. Most sectors of China’s 
economy are open to new entry by enterprises in all ownership forms; in industry, for which detailed data are 
available, only 35% of value-added in 2003 was produced by state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. (Statistical 
Yearbook 2004, pp. 53, 518.) Other constraints remain, from ownership restrictions in the banking system to the 
appointment mechanisms in state-owned enterprises and the prohibition of land sales among farmers. 
16   The first two are standard fare in development economics; see, for example, James Cypher and James Dietz 
(1997), pp. 27ff., 267, 403. The third is a basic theorem in trade theory as a corollary of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theorem; see, for example, Dominick Salvatore (1998), Chapter 5. No attempt is made to control for the varying 
degrees to which these patterns might apply to a specific country at a given point of time (with variations in degree 
due to, for example, policy constraints).  
17   Other East- or South-East Asian nations could have been included. The Philippines, in particular, would have 
been an interesting case due to the generally poor economic growth performance (significantly different values of 
the dependent variable than in the other four countries). But including the Philippines would have meant controlling 
for religion, and perhaps also for climate and ownership structure. This would imply gaining one degree of freedom 
(one extra observation, the Philippines), while at the same time losing between one and three degrees of freedom 
due to the new control variable(s), with no overall gain, if not a loss, of explanatory power. Singapore or Hong Kong 
would have required a city-state control variable, and perhaps a second control variable to account for the fact that 
Hong Kong since 1997 is part of China. Thailand and Malaysia would probably have confirmed the patterns 
observed for Korea and Taiwan. India may have needed a separate control variable for colonial history. Going 
further afield would have meant the necessity for more control variables, but the absence of data on one control 
variable even if in one country only would then have brought about the loss of this control variable, causing omitted 
variable bias. 
18   Employment data for China experience a statistical break between 1989 and 1990 when total employment, 
following the 1990 population census, increases by 17.03%. In the following, total employment data for the years 
prior to 1990 are adjusted. For details see Carsten Holz (2005b). 
19   This leaves unaddressed the question of how much catching up is feasible for a given country at a given time. 
Moses Abramovitz (1986) elaborates on the “social capability” to catch up and on the factors controlling the rate of 
realization of the potential for catching up (facilities for the diffusion of knowledge, conditions facilitating or 
hindering structural change, and macroeconomic and monetary conditions). 
20   If the scope for catching up were measured by the labor productivity differences in the industrial sector only 
(rather than economy-wide), China’s highest level of catching up would probably be slightly higher, but not yet in 
the range where the corresponding growth rates of real GPD per laborer fall off significantly (see  , Japan; 




21   These assumptions are: two countries; two commodities (goods); two factors of production; same, constant 
returns to scale technology in use in both countries; across both countries one commodity is labor intensive, the 
other capital intensive; incomplete specialization in production in both countries; tastes are equal in both countries; 
perfect competition in both goods and factor markets in both countries; perfect labor mobility within each country 
but no international factor mobility; no transportation costs, tariffs, or other obstructions to the free flow of 
international trade; all resources are fully employed in both countries; international trade between the two countries 
is balanced. (Dominick Salvatore, 1998, p. 110.) 
22   The factor price equalization theorem would also appear to provide the basis of the “comparative-advantage 
following strategy” argued for by Justin Lin, Cai Fang, and Li Zhou (2003) 
23   A chart with annual wages relative to the U.S., based on the absolute factor price equalization theorem, is very 
similar to Figure   (with GDP per laborer as a measure of catching up) and omitted; this is due to the fact that labor 
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shares in GDP tend to be constant over time and similar across countries. (Wages are obtained by dividing the labor 
remuneration component of GPD by the number of laborers.) 
24   Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 352) stress that “growth accounting does not … constitute a 
theory of economic growth because it does not attempt to explain how the changes in inputs and the improvements 
in total factor productivity relate to elements—such as aspects of preferences, technology, and government 
policies—that can reasonably be viewed as fundamentals.” However, what explains preferences, technology, and 
government policies? Trying to trace economic growth back to original causes presents a problem of infinite regress. 
The decision on when to stop, i.e., which level to view as ultimate “explanation,” appears arbitrary. 
25   The growth rate is defined as percentage change. Using first differences of all variables in natural logarithms 
yields similar regression results. At China’s relatively large annual growth rates, the first differences of natural 
logarithms constitute an inexact approximation of the growth rates. For example, a 10% growth rate of, say, output, 
and a 15% growth rate of, say, capital, turn into 9.53% and 13.98% if natural logarithms are used. If growth rates are 
taken over several years, first differences of natural logarithms represent an increasingly inaccurate approximation 
of growth rates. 
26   The results are sensitive to the particular capital measure used. The capital measure used in the reported results 
throughout this paper is the one identified as the most preferred one in Carsten Holz (2005a). With other capital 
series, the coefficient values change, but remain insignificant. 
27   Gregory Chow Kui-Wai Li (2002) estimate the growth accounting equation (1) in logarithms for the years 
1952-98, i.e., including the pre-reform period, but then excluding 1958-69. They correct for serial correlation. Their 
regression is also run imposing constant returns to scale. The coefficient estimates are significant and plausible in 
terms of factor shares. Imposing constant returns to scale on the reform period data here also yields significant and 
plausible results, which, however, disappear once serial correlation is corrected for. Gregory Chow and Kui-Wai Li 
ignore a statistical break in the labor series between 1989 and 1990. Their labor measure, in logs, jumps from 5.5329 
to 6.3909; a note reports that adjustments for the statistical break do not change the results. Carsten Holz (2005b) 
addresses (adjusts for) the statistical break in the labor series and constructs economy-wide midyear labor values. 
Carsten Holz (2005a) raises a number of questions about the capital series used by Gregory Chow (1993) and 
Gregory Chow and Kui-Wai Li (2002). 
28   If real GDP is obtained by applying the implicit deflator as first published to the official nominal GDP series, 
the labor coefficient in the first equation turns negative and halves in the second equation, but all coefficients remain 
insignificant. The rationale for using the implicit deflator as first published, i.e., as obtainable from nominal GDP 
data as first published combined with real GDP growth rates as first published, is the following. The National 
Bureau of Statistics in May 2005 provided final revised nominal GDP data for 2003, and similarly in previous years. 
When the NBS first published 2003 nominal GDP data in the Statistical Yearbook 2004 in fall 2004 (apart from 
earlier estimates), it is highly likely that it had available final price indices for all sectors. Most price indices are 
compiled monthly and published with little time lag. In sectors where base year prices are used, these apply only to 
the directly reporting enterprises, on which economic data are immediately available (and need no revisions later); 
the deflator for the whole sector is derived from the data reported by these enterprises on output in constant and 
fixed prices. In other words, the likelihood for a need to revise the implicit GDP deflator of 2003 after fall 2004 is 
near-zero. It is unclear why the NBS does (usually) not revise its published real growth rates; perhaps it is such a 
highly publicized and political figure that the originally published real growth rate becomes sacrosanct?  
29   Alwyn Young (2003, p. 1232, note 17) reports that using the Tornqvist weighted sum of the sectoral real growth 
rates reduces the official GDP growth rate by 0.2% per year. His data are for 1978-98. He does not specify which 
sectoral breakdown he uses. I was unable to replicate his findings. Based on the real growth rates of the three 
economic sectors (primary, secondary, tertiary), using the Tornqvist method, average annual aggregate GDP real 
growth in the period 1978-98 was 0.05% below the official one (or 0.06% if the 1978 growth rate over 1977 is 
included); re-composing, in addition, secondary sector growth from that of industry and construction, and tertiary 
sector growth from that of all tertiary sector subsectors yields a 0.07% (0.09%) divergence. 
30   Wang Yan and Yao Yudong (2003, p. 39) do not adopt Alwyn Young’s method because they feel that the 
surveys on which Alwyn Young bases his estimations are not representative samples. James Heckman (2005) argues 
that “the low private rate of return to education [of, depending on study, around 4% or 7%] does not reflect the true 
rate of return in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Labor markets were so distorted in China that wages did not reflect 
the true marginal contribution of educated labor to the economy.” James Heckman estimates a social return “as high 
as 30% or 40%” (p. 62). This severely questions, if not invalidates Alwyn Young’s weighting of education in the 
derivation of the growth rate of human capital, and subsequently questions the validity of Alwyn Young’s measures 
of the contribution of human capital to output growth. 
31   Two other implications are no factor substitution between intermediate inputs and labor and capital, and an 
elasticity of substitution of unity. Switching to gross output value as the output variable and including intermediate 
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inputs on the right-hand side for the period 1978-2002 yields a highly significant coefficient of intermediate inputs 
but negative contributions to output growth (or output in logs) of labor and capital (both insignificant when growth 
accounting is in growth rates, and both significant when in logarithms). Switching to the translog production 
function (which makes no assumptions about the elasticity of substitution) leads to many significant coefficients but 
significant negative first-order effects of capital and coefficient values of labor and capital in the hundreds rather 
than in the expected factor share range. (In contrast, Wu Yanrui, 2004, estimates a frontier production function 
resembling a translog with restrictions, using a provincial-level panel data set for the years 1981-97, to obtain 
plausible coefficient estimates.) In both regressions, adding the average years of schooling of laborers does not 
change the results; education also comes with a negative coefficient (in the second regression it tends to be negative 
in all terms in which education appears). 
32   The manipulations are: taking derivatives with respect to time, dividing by GDP, expanding right-hand side 
terms to be able to simplify some combinations of variables to factor shares, assuming factor shares and growth rates 
of the wage rate and of the rental rate of capital to be constant, integrating with respect to time, then taking 
antilogarithms. Also see Jesus Felipe and Carsten Holz (2001). The growth accounting equation as presented also 
follows from other production functions, such as the CES (if the elasticity of substitution approaches unity), the 
translog (if the additional terms are insignificant), or the general production function Yt = F(Kt, Lt, t). 
33   See, for example, Ishaq Nadiri (1970, pp. 1145f.). In general, the assumption of an economy-wide aggregate 
production function requires stringent criteria. For example, with constant returns to scale, only two factors of 
production, and all technical change in form of capital-augmenting technical change, the necessary condition for 
aggregation is that all capital is perfectly substitutable. The basic farming utensils used by half of China’s laborers 
are unlikely to be suitable to etch transistors into microchips at China’s newest fabs. 
34   See Jesus Felipe and Carsten Holz (2001) for the range of variation, determined in simulations, that yields 
“good” results of an estimated Cobb-Douglas production function (growth accounting equation). In the case of 
China in the period 1978 through 2002, the labor share is sufficiently stable with a standard deviation of only 0.0111, 
but the variations in the growth rates of wages and of the rental rate of capital are too high.  
35   Provincial gross value-added in the income approach in most years, for most provinces, exactly equals 
provincial gross value-added in the production approach, China’s official approach to calculating GDP. But the sum 
of provincial gross value-added only closely, not perfectly matches China’s national GDP value; the NBS does not 
solely rely on the provincial data when deriving the national GDP value. In addition, a very few provinces do not 
report income components for some of the early reform years. As long as the discrepancy between sum provincial 
GDP and national GDP does not reflect a particular bias in the size of one or more of the different income 
components (and there is no reason why it should), the procedure used here yields accurate national income 
component values. The provincial data are from GDP 1952-95 for the years 1978-1995, and from GDP 1996-2002 
for the years 1996-2002; since the mid-1990s, each issue of the annual Statistical Yearbook also reports the data of 
the previous year. 
36   The definition of operating surplus in China follows the standard System of National Accounts promulgated by 
the United Nations. At the enterprise level, business profit equals profit net of investment returns and non-business 
revenues. Individual-owned enterprises with seven or fewer employees (getihu) by definition do not have any 
operating surplus; their operating surplus is subsumed in labor remuneration. In as far as the individual-owned 
economy grows over time relative to other ownership forms, operating surplus as a share of GDP is likely to fall. 
For details on the link between business profit (or profit) and the operating surplus see Carsten Holz (2003), pp. 88f. 
37   Arnold Harberger (1998, p. 1) postulates a growth equation that attributes “to each factor a marginal product 
measured by its economic reward” in form of  R K L w y p + Δ + ) ( Δ = Δ + ρ δ , with the variables denoting initial 
general price level, change in output (GDP), initial real wage, change in labor input, initial real rate of return to 
capital, rate of real depreciation of capital, change in capital stock, and the residual interpreted as “real cost 
reduction.” Compared to the definitional identity of the income growth accounting equation (and incorporating the 
price level in the coefficients of capital rather than in capital), the real cost reduction in his postulated equation, once 
divided by output, is identical to the weighted growth rates of real wages, the real depreciation rate, the real rate of 
return, and a particular form of change in the rate of net taxes on production.  
38   Since the right-hand side variables are deflated using the implicit GDP deflator as first published, real growth 
rates of GDP are also based on this deflator. GDP based on the official real growth rates (which are usually not 
revised, while nominal data are), grew by 759%. 
39   The income version of the growth accounting equation allows a distinction between different capital concepts, 
such as an accounting vs. production concept, for the depreciation vs. the operating surplus component. The results 
are necessarily similar. Details are provided in Appendix 3.  
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40   Annual data on laborers by age and education for the period 1978-2003 are obtained / calculated from the 1982, 
1990, and 2000 population censuses together with the 1987 and 1995 1% population sample surveys. Projections for 
the years 2000-2025 make use of year 2000 census data and past patterns and trends. All calculations and 
estimations are explained in Carsten Holz (2005b). 
41   Alwyn Young (2003), for example, regresses individuals’ wages on gender, age (for which he has a total of 11 
categories), and education (total of 4 categories).  
42   The likelihood ratio statistics with a small-sample multiplication factor of T-c (T numbers of observations, c 
numbers of restrictions) as well as the Schwartz Information Criterion were used to determine when to stop reducing 
the number of lags. The number of observations was held constant across all lag lengths, but because the number of 
observations is so small (annual data for the years 1978-2002), alternatively, the values of the decision criteria were 
also calculated for the maximum number of observations at each lag length, and a multiplication factor of T was also 
used as an alternative with the likelihood ratio statistic. As a result of the different criteria, often more than one lag 
length appeared plausible. In that case, all relevant lag lengths were taken to the next step of cointegration testing. 
43   The R
2 values of the individual VEC equations all tend to be in the 0.8 and 0.9 range. Apart from the results 
reported in the table, many cointegration equations have insignificant coefficients, some cointegration equations 
have highly implausible coefficient values (and then always a comparatively poor fit when contrasted to the actual 
real wage rate series in a chart), and a very few, with significant and plausible coefficients, yield similar results as 
those reported in the table. The ones reported in the table have the best fit in a visual comparison of the actual and 
fitted values. 
44   A different cointegration equation involving the share of laborers with primary school education rather than the 
share of laborers with upper middle school education exhibits strong Granger causality from both education 
variables to the wage series. The share of laborers with primary school education also has a negative coefficient. In a 
visual comparison of the actual wage series and these two fitted series, the fitted series reported in the table with the 
share of laborers with upper middle school education better matched the actual series. 
45   Similarly, the largest share of the forecast error variance of the share of laborers with upper middle school 
education is due to its own shocks, but 60% of the forecast error variance of the share of laborers with college level 
education or above is explained by variation in the share of laborers with upper middle school education. The 
forecast error variance decomposition depends, in this particular instance, much on the Cholesky ordering of the 
variables. Reversing the order, 63% of the variance of the wage is explained by variation in the share of laborers at 
upper middle school. 
46   Non-education variables are typically not cointegrated with the wage rate. Age, or age squared, does not have a 
unit root. The difference in the choice of variables for the cointegration equations in levels vs. in logarithms is 
necessitated by the fact that some variables have unit roots when the variable is measured in levels, but not when it 
is measured in logarithms, and vice-versa. For example, in levels, ‘average years of schooling minus five’ is not I(1) 
but I(2), while the share of laborers with college level education or above in logarithms is I(2). Average years of 
schooling is I(2) independent of if the variable is in levels or in logarithms. 
47   The underlying predicted cumulative real growth rate of wages in the period 2000-03, for which actual values 
are available, is 10.11% and 16.52% compared to the actual cumulative real growth rate of 21.26%. 
48   The labor share in GDP (not net of taxes) has been near-constant throughout the reform period, with a mean of 
0.5210 and a standard deviation of 0.0111 in 1978-2002, i.e., the coefficient of variation is only 2%. 
49   The U.S. and Chinese education systems are not perfectly comparable. Appendix 5 establishes the equivalence 
of different degrees in the two countries. Three main complications are the following. First, the Chinese special 
middle-school degree is at least equivalent to the U.S. high school degree, but possibly in some circumstances even 
to the U.S. post-high school associate degree. Second, while the U.S. and China have comparable BA degrees, the 
Chinese MA degree differs from the U.S. MA degree in that the Chinese MA degree is a three-year post-BA 
research (thesis) degree rather than a one- to two-year predominantly taught degree; the Chinese PhD differs from 
the U.S. PhD in that it requires a prior MA and in that it is usually obtained in three years’ time, compared to longer 
average study times for the U.S. PhD. Third, Chinese professional degrees are usually obtained in form of a BA, but 
may also take the form of an MA or PhD. 
50   The educational level of the age cohorts in the late 40s may be exaggerated in that some upper middle school 
graduates in China during the Cultural Revolution may have enjoyed no more than a lower middle school education 
under the label of an upper middle school education. 
51   The 2004 figure for China is from the Statistical Abstract 2005, p. 175, and the 2005 figure from Caijing, no. 
134 (30 May 2005), p. 11. 
52   This assumes a narrow definition of undergraduate level graduates in China and a broad definition for the case 
of the U.S. In the case of China, the data comprise college-level associate degrees and BA degrees of regular 
institutions of higher education, i.e., omit associate degrees issued by non-regular institutions of higher education. In 
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the case of the U.S., the data comprise associate degrees, BA degrees, and first professional degrees. In China, the 
number of (typically 3-year) college-level associate degrees and the number of BA degrees in 2003 were 
approximately equal. In the U.S., the second outnumber the first (in the U.S. 2-year programs) two to one. 
53   The table also reports a ratio including, in the U.S. figure, recipients of first professional degrees. In this case, 
the ratio is slightly lower. But with Chinese medical doctors and lawyers primarily holding a BA degree (in the 
medical doctor’s case a 5-year BA program), it seems inappropriate to include graduates of medical and law schools 
in the U.S. case but not in the Chinese case. 
54   These data ignore Chinese students studying abroad since no specific degree and program completion data are 
available on these. Assuming Chinese students abroad were all studying in MA and PhD programs abroad, their 
number in 2000 was equivalent to approximately one-third of year 2003 domestic MA and PhD graduates; the 
number of returning students after completed studies was one-sixth of the number of domestic MA and PhD 
graduates in 2003. 
55   The low number of Chinese high school graduates in the early 1980s could coincide with the reduction in 
compulsory education from 12 to 9 years, the exact date of which I am not aware of (and which could vary across 
localities).  
56   A breakdown of the “tuition and child care” price index into the two components tuition and child care is only 
available for 1988 through 1993. During these years, tuition prices rose almost twice as fast as child care prices; 
tuition had a three-quarter weight in the price index “tuition and child care.” For the data see the price section in the 
Price Yearbook 1989 through 1994. In 2001, the primary classification of the CPI into goods vs. services was 
replaced by eight categories, each of which contains sub-categories of goods and services. Thus, the former 
subcategory xueza baoyufei within the category services, in the source translated as “tuition and childcare,” was 
reclassified as a subcategory of “recreation, education, and culture;” in this process the Chinese but not the English 
title was rephrased (to become xueza tuoyoufei). The extremely fast rise in the price of tuition and child care is likely 
to still ignore the often extra fees paid in addition to the official tuition fees. 
57   The head count comparison is furthermore likely to be incomplete, since education in China outside the regular 
institutions of higher education has not been taken into consideration, while the U.S. data make no distinction 
between “official” and “unofficial” education. For example, adult education outside the regular university system in 
China is not included in the tertiary education data presented. In 2001, 316,367 persons graduated with a degree 
from a tertiary level adult education institution. This number corresponds to just below 1‰ of the population age 25-
40 on 1 November 2000. (Census 2000, Vol. 1, pp. 215-7; Education Yearbook 2002, p. 107) 
58   There is little doubt that the Chinese education system is indeed capable of identifying the brightest children, 
with lower middle school to university admission now routinely based on entrance examinations. James Heckman 
(2005) expresses concern about financial hurdles for children from low-income families. 
59   Given the demographics, why has China not “overtaken” the U.S. a long time ago? The immediate answer is 
China’s choice of economic system prior to 1978. With uniform wages and access to higher-level education severely 
limited, neither were incentives for human capital accumulation in place nor the opportunities available. For 
example, tertiary level education almost ceased during the Cultural Revolution. In 1971, a since 1949 low of 600 
students are reported to have graduated from a regular institution of higher education, down from 186,000 in 1965; 
only by 1977 did the figure again reach the 1965 level, with 194,000 graduates. (Statistical Yearbook 1990, p. 709.) 
This means that among the older generations, only the generation born in or before the 1940s had some access to 
tertiary level education. 
60   See Statistical Yearbook 2001, p. 80 (Balance of Payments), 2003, p. 67 (GDP), p. 654 (exchange rate). In 
France it was 28.54%, in Germany 33.76%, in the UK 27.90%, and in the relatively small South Korea 44.79%. 
(Data for all countries except China are from the IFS. The value of China’s exports of goods and services is not 
reported in the IFS, only the net export value, i.e., the difference of exports and imports of goods and services. The 
data on net exports and GDP for China in the IFS are virtually identical to those reported in China’s national income 
accounts in the Statistical Yearbook series.) 
61   See Statistical Yearbook 2004, pp. 53, 84, 714. 
62   These data do not include foreign-funded (or Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan) stock companies in China. For the 
data see Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 519. The industrial enterprises with annual sales revenue in excess of 5m yuan 
RMB in 2003 accounted for 79.09% of all industrial value-added in China (p. 53); some of the smaller enterprises 
could also be foreign-funded. 
63   Qi Yuanjun (2005) presents an overview of progress towards the calculation of green GDP for China. No 
economy-wide figure appears as yet available, but work by the NBS and China’s National Environmental Protection 
Office has begun to put a framework for green GDP into place within 3-6 years. 
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